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In Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co.,'
the Supreme Court rejected the rule prevailing in at least three
circuits that written works produced through industrious labor,
in addition to those produced through original creation, were
eligible for federal copyright protection.2 In doing so, however,
the Court declined to hold, merely as a matter of statutory
interpretation, that the so-called "sweat of the brow" doctrine
was invalid under the Copyright Act of 1976's requirement that
copyrightable works possess a threshold level of original
creativity. Rather, the Court went well beyond this determi-
nation to hold the principle fatally inconsistent with the
Constitution's Intellectual Property Clause, which authorizes
Congress "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,
by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."4
In doing so, the Court recognized in the copyright context an
apparent constitutional right to copy separate and independent
of any such right that may be found in the statute.
It is the thesis of this Article that the constitutional
principles upon which Feist rests are equally applicable in
another area, namely federal trade dress5 protection under the
Lanham Act.6 Specifically, this Article argues that Feist merely
reaffirmed the Court's prior holdings in cases involving product
configurations that the Intellectual Property Clause creates and
defines a public domain that trumps all federal intellectual
property legislation and not just that in Feist. As set forth below
in greater detail, the boundaries of the right to copy set by this
constitutional public domain extend in the trade dress context to
1. 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
2. See Rural Tel. Serv. Co. v. Feist Publications, Inc., 916 F.2d 718 (10th
Cir. 1990) (holding that the white pages of a telephone book constitute
protectable original work of authorship), rev'd, 499 U.S. 340 (1991); Hutchinson
Tel. Co. v. Fronteer Directory Co., 770 F.2d 128, 131-32 (8th Cir. 1985) (holding
copyrightable a directory compiled by the telephone company); Schroeder v.
William Morrow & Co., 566 F.2d 3, 5 (7th Cir. 1977) (explaining that industry,
not novelty, makes a work copyrightable).
3. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1994).
4. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (emphasis added).
5. Trade dress encompasses the image, packaging and labels for a product
or service. For a full discussion, see infra notes 11-17 and accompanying text.
6. Pub. L. No. 79-489, 60 Stat. 427 (1946) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1994)).
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the purely functional aspects of plaintiffs' designs. Recognition
of these boundaries is particularly important in light of the
prevailing tendency among courts to treat trade dress law's
nonfunctionality requirement as a mere creature of statute,
subject to legislative abrogation.'
Part I of this Article explores the principles governing trade
dress protection under the common law and the Lanham Act.
This Part includes a critical examination of the Supreme Court's
interpretations of the Intellectual Property Clause in United
States v. Steffens (The Trade-Mark Cases),8 Bonito Boats, Inc.
v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc.,9 and Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite
Lighting, Inc.," the latter of which contains two constitutional
holdings rather than the single pronouncement most commonly
recognized by courts and commentators. Part II of the Article
examines the rise and fall of the sweat of the brow doctrine, with
a particular focus on the Supreme Court's treatment of the
Intellectual Property Clause in Feist. Part III argues that the
constitutional holding of Feist unmistakably answers certain
questions about the law governing the protection of trade dress
that the lower federal courts have failed to resolve. This Part
proposes a new "thin" concept of protectable trade dress
consisting of functional and nonfunctional elements that
corresponds to the "thin" copyright recognized by Feist and that
more fully complies with the mandates of the Intellectual
Property Clause than the doctrine currently applied by most
courts.
I. TRADE DRESS AND FUNCTIONALITY
A. THE HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE NONFUNCTIONALITY
REQUIREMENT
1. Trade Dress Doctrine and Its Early Development
Defined generally, "trade dress" is the overall image used to
present a product or service to purchasers." In its most
7. See infra notes 126-134 and accompanying text (describing case law
holding that passage of the Lanham Act altered traditional treatment of
functional configurations).
8. 100 U.S. 82 (1879).
9. 489 U.S. 141 (1989).
10. 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
11. See, e.g., Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2753,2755 n.1(1992) (describing trade dress as the total image of a business); John H.
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common form, trade dress consists of the packaging and labels
for a particular product. 2 It also, however, can include charac-
teristics of a good itself, such as its configuration, 3 color,'4 or
fragrance. In still less common situations, cognizable trade
dress can consist even of the physical appearance of buildings
associated with a plaintiff's services 6 or its unique sales
Harland Co. v. Clarke Checks, Inc., 711 F.2d 966, 980 (11th Cir. 1983) (" Trade
dress' involves the total image of a product.").
12. 'IT]he majority of trade dress claims involve a manufacturer's container
or packaging for a product." Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Toy Loft,
Inc., 684 F.2d 821, 831 (11th Cir. 1982); see also Ideal Toy Corp. v. Plawner Toy
Mfg. Corp., 685 F.2d 78, 80 n.2 (3d Cir. 1982) ("[H]istorically trade dress
infringement consisted of copying a product's packaging.... ."). For representa-
tive cases addressing the protectability of product packaging, see Paddington
Corp. v. Attiki Importers & Distribs., Inc., 996 F.2d 577 (2d Cir. 1993) (alcoholic
beverage bottle configuration); AmBrit, Inc. v. Kraft, Inc., 812 F.2d 1531 (11th
Cir. 1986) (foil wrapper for frozen ice cream bar), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041
(1987); Sun-Fun Prods., Inc. v. Suntan Research & Dev., Inc., 656 F.2d 186 (5th
Cir. Unit B 1981) (exterior of suntan lotion bottle); S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc. v.
Carter-Wallace, Inc., 614 F. Supp. 1278 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (shaving cream can).
13. See, e.g., Imagineering, Inc. v. Van Kiassens, Inc., 53 F.3d 1260 (Fed.
Cir.) (configuration of furniture), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 277 (1995); Kohler Co.
v. Moen Inc., 12 F.3d 632 (7th Cir. 1993) (configuration of water faucet);
Merchant & Evans, Inc. v. Roosevelt Bldg. Prods. Co., 963 F.2d 628 (3d Cir.
1992) (configuration of roofing materials); Bauer Lamp Co. v. Shaffer, 941 F.2d
1165 (11th Cir. 1991) (per curiam) (configuration of electric lamp); Brunswick
Corp. v. Spinit Reel Co., 832 F.2d 513 (10th Cir. 1987) (configuration of fishing
reel cover); LeSportsac, Inc. v. K Mart Corp., 754 F.2d 71 (2d Cir. 1985)
(appearance of carrying bags); John H. Harland Co. v. Clarke Checks, Inc., 711
F.2d 966 (11th Cir. 1983) (appearance of bank check stubs); Dallas Cowboys
Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1979)
(appearance of cheerleaders' uniforms); Truck Equip. Serv. Co. v. Fruehauf
Corp., 536 F.2d 1210 (8th Cir.) (shape of truck trailer), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
861 (1976).
14. See, e.g., Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 115 S. Ct. 1300 (1995)
(green-gold color associated with plaintiffs dry cleaning press pads); Master
Distribs., Inc. v. Pako Corp., 986 F.2d 219 (8th Cir. 1993) (blue splicing tape);
In re Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 774 F.2d 1116 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (pink
fiberglass insulation).
15. See, e.g., In re Clarke, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1238, 1239 (T.T.A.B. 1990)
(scented yarn and embroidery thread).
16. For representative cases addressing the protectability of restaurant
appearance as trade dress, see Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 112 S. Ct.
2753 (1992); Fuddruckers, Inc. v. Doc's B.R. Others, Inc., 826 F.2d 837 (9th Cir.
1987); Prufrock Ltd. v. Lasater, 781 F.2d 129 (8th Cir. 1986); T.G.I. Friday's,
Inc. v. International Restaurant Group, Inc., 569 F.2d 895 (5th Cir. 1978);
McDonald's Corp. v. Moore, 363 F.2d 435 (5th Cir. 1966) (per curiam); White
Tower Sys., Inc. v. White Castle Sys. of Eating Houses Corp., 90 F.2d 67 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 720 (1937); Morton v. Rank Am., Inc., 812 F. Supp.
1062 (C.D. Cal. 1993); House of Hunan, Inc. v. Hunan at Pavilion, 227 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 803 (D.D.C. 1985); Warehouse Restaurant, Inc. v. Customs House
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1996] TRADE DRESS PROTECTION 599
techniques. 7 Although historically less well recognized than its
trademark and service mark counterparts, 8 trade dress serves
the identical function of identifying the origin of its owners'
goods and services.'9 Under section 32 and section 43(a) of the
Lanham Act,2" as well as under the common law, a plaintiff
with prior use of a valid trade dress in commerce2' can proceed
Restaurant, Inc., 217 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 411 (N.D. Cal. 1982).
17. Compare Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Toy Loft, Inc., 684 F.2d
821, 831 (11th Cir. 1982) (holding protectable as trade dress "adoption"
procedures associated with plaintiffs dolls) with Haagen-Dazs, Inc. v. Frusen
Gladje Ltd., 493 F. Supp. 73, 75 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (declining to protect plaintiffs
use of Scandinavian motif in marketing of ice cream).
18. Under the Lanham Act, a "trademark" may be "any word, name,
symbol, or device, or any combination thereof" used by its owner "to identify and
distinguish his or her goods, including a unique product, from those manufac-
tured or sold by others and to indicate the source of the goods, even if that
source is unknown," while a "service mark" acts to identify and distinguish the
services of its owner. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1994). Although they emerged
relatively late in the history of unfair competition law, the Act also provides for
federal protection of "certification marks," which certify such things as a
product's regional origin or mode of manufacture, and "collective marks," which
include designations indicating membership in a union, an association or other
organization. Id. In keeping with the convention employed by the Act, and
because the distinctions between purely verbal indicators of origin are largely
irrelevant for purposes of this Article, the term "marks" as used in this Article
collectively refers to all of these designations unless otherwise noted.
19. See Two Pesos, 112 S. Ct. at 2760 ("[Tlhe protection of trademarks and
trade dress ... serves the same statutory purpose of preventing deception and
unfair competition. There is no persuasive reason to apply [a] different analysis
to the two.").
20. Section 32 of the Lanham Act creates a cause of action on behalf of the
owner of a federally registered trade dress against anyone who, without consent,
uses in interstate commerce a "reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable
imitation" of the registered mark or trade dress. 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (1994).
Similarly, section 43(a) of the Act allows the owners of registered or unregis-
tered marks or trade dresses to bring infringement actions against defendants
using "false designation[s] of origin." Id. § 1125(a). Although trade dresses, like
trademarks, service marks, collective marks, and certification marks, may be
federally registered, see, e.g., McDonald's Corp. v. Moore, 363 F.2d 435 (5th Cir.
1966) (federal registration of yellow parabolic arches used in design of plaintiffs
buildings), most trade dress infringement cases involve owners of unregistered
trade dresses proceeding under section 43(a).
21. As the Restatement has explained:
Rights can be acquired in a designation only when the designation
has been actually used as a [trade dress] ... or when an applicable
statutory provision recognizes a protectable interest in the designation
prior to actual use. A designation is "used" as a [trade dress]... when
the designation is displayed or otherwise made known to prospective
purchasers in the ordinary course of business in a manner that
associates the designation with the goods, services, or business of the
user ....
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against others using confusingly similar trade dresses.22 To
qualify for protection, the plaintiff's trade dress must be (1) a
distinctive indicator of origin23 and (2) "nonfunctional" or, in
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 18, at 184 (1995). As this
language suggests, since the enactment of the Trademark Law Revision Act of
1988, Pub. L. No. 100-667, 102 Stat. 3935, federal law has permitted the filing
of applications to register designations of origin on the basis of an intent to use,
rather than actual use. See 15 U.S.C. § 1051(b) (1994). Even under the revised
Lanham Act, however, intent to use applications can mature into registrations
only after applicants demonstrate use of their designations in interstate
commerce. See id. § 1051(d).
22. As framed by Justice Stevens:
[T]he test for liability [for trademark infringement] is likelihood of
confusion: "[U]nder the Lanham Act .... the ultimate test is whether
the public is likely to be deceived or confused by the similarity of the
marks. . . Whether we call the violation infringement, unfair
competition or false designation of origin, the test is identical-is there
a 'likelihood of confusion?'"
Two Pesos, 112 S. Ct. at 2763 (Stevens, J., concurring) (alteration in original)
(quoting New West Corp. v. NYM Co., 595 F.2d 1194, 1201 (9th Cir. 1979)). For
the tests employed by the various circuits to determine whether confusion is
likely, see Boston Athletic Ass'n v. Sullivan, 867 F.2d 22, 29 (1st Cir. 1989);
Ambrit, Inc. v. Kraft, Inc., 812 F.2d 1531, 1538 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied,
481 U.S. 1041 (1987); Beer Nuts, Inc. v. Clover Club Foods Co., 805 F.2d 920,
925 (10th Cir. 1986); Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 775 F.2d 247, 248
(8th Cir. 1985); Fuji Photo Film Co. v. Shinohara Shoji Kabushiki Kaisha, 754
F.2d 591, 595 (5th Cir. 1985); Pizzeria Uno Corp. v. Temple, 747 F.2d 1522,
1527 (4th Cir. 1984); Interpace Corp. v. Lapp, Inc., 721 F.2d 460, 463 (3d Cir.
1983); Frisch's Restaurants, Inc. v. Elby's Big Boy, Inc., 670 F.2d 642, 648 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 916 (1982); AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d
341, 348-49 (9th Cir. 1979); Helene Curtis Indus. v. Church & Dwight Co., 560
F.2d 1325, 1330 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1070 (1978); In re E.I.
DuPont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361 (C.C.P.A. 1973); Polaroid Corp.
v. Polarad Elec. Corp., 287 F.2d 492 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 820 (1961).
23. Although an inquiry into the distinctiveness requirement for trade
dress protection is beyond the scope of this Article, the plaintiff owner of a trade
dress must demonstrate in an infringement suit that prospective purchasers
perceive the trade dress as a symbol of identification that indicates an
association with a particular source. See, e.g., Brooks Shoe Mfg. Co. v. Suave
Shoe Corp., 716 F.2d 854, 857-62 (11th Cir. 1983) (holding that design affixed
to athletic shoe was not inherently distinctive and that plaintiff had not
established secondary meaning). The most cost-effective means for meeting this
requirement often is for a plaintiff to receive under the Lanham Act a federal
registration covering the trade dress in question. Under section 33(a) of the
Act, a certificate of registration constitutes "prima facie" evidence of distinctive-
ness. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1057(b), 1115(a) (1994). If the registration is more than five
years old, this presumption can become "conclusive," provided that the
registrant complies with certain procedural formalities. See id. §§ 1065,
1115(b); see also Park'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189,205
(1985) (holding that incontestable registration precludes challenges to
distinctiveness of registered mark).
The plaintiff owner of an unregistered trade dress may establish distinctive-
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other words, not essential to the use or purpose of the associated
good or service or affecting the cost or quality of the good or
service.'
The nonfunctionality requirement's significance to the
relationship between federal trade dress law and that covering
utility patents25 is the focus of this Article. Because trade
ness through one of two showings:
(a) the designation is "inherently distinctive," in that, because of
the nature of the designation and the context in which it is used,
prospective purchasers are likely to perceive it as a designation that,
in the case of a [trade dress], identifies goods or services produced or
sponsored by a particular person, whether known or anonymous...;
or
(b) the designation, although not "inherently distinctive," has
become distinctive, in that, as a result of its use, prospective purchas-
ers have come to perceive it as a designation that identifies goods,
services, businesses ... in the manner described in Subsection (a).
Such acquired distinctiveness is commonly referred to as "secondary
meaning."
RESTATEMENT, supra note 21, § 13(a)-(b), at 104-05.
Although the precise factors used by courts to determine whether an
unregistered trade dress has, in fact, achieved the requisite secondary meaning
differ, the test applied by the Eleventh Circuit is characteristic:
The factors to consider ... are: (1) the length and manner of its
use; (2) the nature and extent of advertising and promotion; (3) the
efforts made by the plaintiff to promote a conscious connection in the
public's mind between the [trade dress] and the plaintiffs product or
business; and (4) the extent to which the public actually identifies the
[trade dress] with the plaintiffs product or venture.
Conagra, Inc. v. Singleton, 743 F.2d 1508, 1513 (11th Cir. 1984).
24. Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 850 n.10 (1982); see
also Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 115 S. Ct. 1300, 1304 (1995)
(explaining that courts cannot grant trademark status to functional characteris-
tics, thereby providing enduring monopoly control over those characteristics);
Two Pesos, 112 S. Ct. at 2758 (noting that eligibility for protection requires
nonfunctionality).
25. Subject to certain exceptions, see infra note 221 and accompanying
text, utility patents are available to any person who "invents or discovers any
new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any
new and useful improvements thereof." 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994). As explained
by the United States Patent and Trademark Office:
A patent for an invention is a grant of a property right by the
Government to the inventor (or his heirs or assigns), acting through
the Patent and Trademark Office....
The right conferred by the patent grant is, in the language of the
statute and of the grant itself, "the right to exclude others from
making, using, or selling" the invention. What is granted is not the
right to make, use, or sell, but the right to exclude others from making,
using, or selling the invention.
PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, UNITED STATES DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
GENERAL INFORMATION CONCERNING PATENTS 2 (1992).
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dress rights accrue from, and are dependent on, use of the trade
dress in commerce,26 they differ in a critical aspect from the
protection provided by utility patents. Utility patent protection
expires at the end of a statutory term, 7 whether or not the
patentee actually makes use of its invention.2' By contrast,
trade dress rights are not so temporally limited in scope.
Rather, as the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals29 has
noted:
The underlying purpose and the essence of patent rights are
separate and distinct from those appertaining to [trade dresses]. No
Federal law also authorizes the issuance by the government of design
patents for "any new, original and ornamental design for an article of
manufacture." 35 U.S.C. § 171 (1994). "To qualify for protection [under a
design patent], a design must present an aesthetically pleasing appearance that
is not dictated by function alone, and must satisfy the other criteria of
patentability." Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141,
148 (1989).
26. Tally-Ho, Inc. v. Coast Community College Dist., 889 F.2d 1018, 1022-
23 (11th Cir. 1989) (per curiam) ("Trademark ownership is always appurtenant
to commercial activity. Thus, actual and continuous use is required to acquire
and retain a protectible interest in a mark." (footnote omitted)); Blue Bell, Inc.
v. Farah Mfg. Co., 508 F.2d 1260, 1265 (5th Cir. 1975) ("The exclusive right to
a trademark belongs to one who first uses it in connection with specified
goods."); see also supra note 21 and accompanying text (describing the Lanham
Act's "use" requirement).
27. For utility patents in force on June 8, 1995, and patent applications
filed on or before June 7, 1995, and subject to certain limited exceptions, 35
U.S.C. § 154(c)(1) (1994) provides for a term of the longer of 20 years from the
date of filing or 17 years from the date of issue. For utility patent applications
filed on or after June 8, 1995, and again subject to certain limited exceptions,
35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (1994) provides that the term of a patent shall be 20 years
from the date of filing of the application or, if the application makes reference
to an earlier filed application under 35 U.S.C. §§ 120, 121, or 365 (1994), from
the date on which the earliest such application was filed.
28. See Michael H. Davis, Death of a Salesman's Doctrine: A Critical Look
at Trademark Use, 19 GA. L. REV. 233,241 n.19 (1985) ("Trademark rights exist
only as long as the mark is used, although there is no fixed limit on protection
so that, theoretically, they could be perpetual.... [However,] [tihere is no
requirement that the patentee use or work the patent to maintain the patent
rights."); see also supra notes 20, 26 and accompanying text (describing the
requirement that trade dresses be used in commerce as a prerequisite to
receiving protection).
29. On October 1, 1982, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
("C.C.P.A.") merged with the United States Claims Court to form the new
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. See Pub. L. No. 97-164,
96 Stat. 25 (1982). Pursuant to South Corp. v. United States, 690 F.2d 1368,
1370-71 (Fed. Cir. 1982) (en banc), all decisions of the C.C.P.. are binding
precedent in the Federal Circuit. For purposes of this Article, references to




right accruing from the one is dependent upon or conditioned to the
other. The longevity of the exclusivity of [a patent] is limited by law
while [a trade dress] may be extended in perpetuity."
The scope of this potentially perpetual protection tradition-
ally has been uncertain in light of the Intellectual Property
Clause's restriction of protection for "Discoveries" to "limited
Times."3 This ambiguity originated in the treatment of word
marks under nineteenth-century common law, which, like the
Lanham Act, afforded mark owners protection against the use of
confusingly similar marks. 2 Early common law cases suggest-
ed this cause of action had two aspects, one turning on the need
to reward the enterprise of mark owners and the other focusing
on prevention of consumer confusion.:s
In 1879, however, the Supreme Court made clear in United
States v. Steffens (The Trade-Mark Cases)34 that the purpose of
trademark law was not to reward creativity and ingenuity. The
30. In re Mogen David Wine Corp., 328 F.2d 925, 929 (C.C.P-.A 1964); see
also Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 115 S. Ct. 1300, 1304 (1995)
(distinguishing patent law as the avenue to short-term protection of functional
features); Truck Equip. Serv. Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., 536 F.2d 1210, 1215 (8th
Cir.) (" he protection accorded by the law of trademark and unfair competition
is greater than that accorded by the law of patents because each is directed at
a different purpose."), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 861 (1976); In re Pollak Steel Co.,
314 F.2d 566, 570 (C.C.PA. 1963) (refusing to grant trademark registration
covering product configuration that would give perpetual rights to a functional
characteristic of a product); In re Shakespeare Co., 289 F.2d 506, 508 (C.C.PA.
1961) (denying trademark registration covering product configuration on the
ground that the Lanham Act does not permit monopolization of a process); Alan
Wood Steel Co. v. Watson, 150 F. Supp. 861, 862 (D.D.C. 1957) ("W]hile a
patent is issued for only a limited term, a trade-mark becomes the permanent
property of its owner and secures for him a monopoly in perpetuity.").
31. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
32. See, e.g., Ellis v. J.H. Zeilin & Co., 42 Ga. 91, 93 (1871) (recognizing a
cause of action against the use of confusingly similar marks); see also supra
note 22 (discussing the "likelihood of confusion" standard of modern decisions).
33. One classic example stated:
The first appropriator of a name or device pointing to his owner-
ship, or which, by being associated with articles of trade, has acquired
an understood reference to the originator, or manufacturer of the
articles, is injured whenever another adopts the same name or device
for similar articles, because such adoption is in effect representing
falsely that the productions of the latter are those of the former. Thus
the custom and advantages to which the enterprise and skill of the
first appropriator had given him a just right are abstracted for
another's use, and this is done by deceiving the public, by inducing the
public to purchase the goods and manufactures of one person supposing
them to be those of another.
Delaware & Hudson Canal Co. v. Clark, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 311, 323 (1871).
34. 100 U.S. 82 (1879).
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Trademark Acts of 187035 and 1876,36 each of which Congress
had passed in reliance on the Intellectual Property Clause,
precipitated this holding. On the appeal of three defendants
convicted of violating the criminal provisions of the 1876 Act, the
Court held both statutes fatally inconsistent with the clause
under which Congress passed them:
The ordinary trade-mark has no necessary relation to invention
or discovery. The trade-mark recognized by the common law is
generally the growth of a considerable period of use, rather than a
sudden invention.... It requires no fancy or imagination, no genius,
no laborious thought. It is simply founded on priority of appro-
priation."
In holding that a designation of origin could not underlie the
statutory monopoly contemplated by the Intellectual Property
Clause, The Trade-Mark Cases thus recognized a principle
recurring in the Court's opinions and given full effect in Feist: In
addition to containing grants of authority to Congress, the
Clause also contains restrictions on federal protection of
intellectual property.
2. The Historical Obfuscation of Constitutional Issues in
Trade Dress Law
Two aspects of early trade dress cases helped obscure the
significance of The Trade-Mark Cases' constitutional holding to
the problem of functionality for the next eighty-five years. First,
most trade dress cases during the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries addressed only the protectability of wholly
nonutilitarian label designs."8 Thus, for example, in M.A.
Thedford Medicine Co. v. Curry,9 the Georgia Supreme Court
recognized the availability of relief on a showing that "the
defendant fraudulently, deceitfully, and with the intent to injure
[the plaintiffs'] business ... simulated [the plaintiffs'] wrappers,
and thus deceived the public into buying large quantities of the
spurious [product] as the genuine." ° Likewise, the New York
Court of Appeals concluded in Fischer v. Blank4 that equity
35. Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, 16 Stat. 198.
36. Act of Aug. 14, 1876, ch. 274, 19 Stat. 141.
37. 100 U.S. at 94.
38. See, e.g., Isador Straus v. Notaseme Hosiery Co., 240 U.S. 179, 180
(1916) (use of nonfunctional design held confusingly similar to federally
registered mark).
39. 22 S.E. 661 (Ga. 1895).
40. Id. at 663.
41. 33 N.E. 1040 (N.Y. 1893).
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would enjoin use of the elements making up packaging "when
all, or a number of them, are combined.., and so arranged and
exhibited that when they strike the eye of the intending
purchaser, possessed of ordinary intelligence and judgment, the
false impression is likely to be produced that the goods of the
plaintiffs are offered."42 Although these types of cases resulted
in an expansion of trade dress rights, the preoccupation of turn
of the century litigants with labels and packaging gave courts
little occasion to address the scope of protection available to
functional product configurations, much less the significance of
The Trade-Mark Cases to that issue.
Second, and notwithstanding the then-pendency of Swift v.
Tyson,43 courts hearing unfair competition cases did not create
a separate body of federal law, but instead relied equally upon
state and federal precedents in entering or denying relief.4
The absence of a recognized distinction between state and
federal law resulted in part from congressional timidity following
The Trade-Mark Cases in reenacting federal legislation under
the auspices of the Commerce Clause.45 As late as the Trade-
mark Act of 1905,46 for example, the federal cause of action for
infringement extended only to marks registered with the
42. Id. at 1041.
43. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), overruled by Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304
U.S. 64 (1938).
44. See, e.g., Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co. v. Houston Ice & Brewing Co., 250
U.S. 28,29-30 (1919) (relying on federal and Massachusetts case law in refusing
to enjoin defendant from using brown bottles with brown labels allegedly
similar to those of plaintiff); Centaur Co. v. Neathery, 91 F. 891, 898-900 (5th
Cir. 1898) (relying on federal and New York case law in enjoining defendant
from using elixir bottles and labels confusingly similar to those used by
plaintiff); Philadelphia Novelty Mfg. Co. v. Rouss, 40 F. 585, 586 (C.C.S.D.N.Y.
1889) (relying on federal and numerous states' case law in refusing to enjoin
defendant from marketing its hair-crimpers in packages reasonably dissimilar
to the packages used by plaintiff).
45. The Commerce Clause grants Congress the plenary power to "regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the
Indian Tribes." U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 3. Although invalidating the 1870
and 1876 acts under the Intellectual Property Clause, the Supreme Court in
The Trade-Mark Cases nevertheless suggested that similar legislation might
withstand constitutional scrutiny under the Commerce Clause instead. See 100
U.S. at 95-96. Accepting this invitation, Congress initially adhered so literally
to this provision's express text that it in 1881 granted the Commissioner of
Patents the authority to register only trademarks used in commerce with
foreign nations or with Native American tribes. See Act of Mar. 3, 1881, ch.
138, 21 Stat. 502 (repealed 1946).
46. Act of Feb. 20, 1905, ch. 592, 33 Stat. 724 (repealed 1946).
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Commissioner of Patents.' Likewise, although the Trade-mark
Act of 192048 recognized for the first time a cause of action
against the infringement of unregistered "designation[s] of
origin" (rather than merely of verbal word marks),49 it never-
theless offered little guidance on the subject of what might
qualify for protection.50 Consequently, little, if any, statutory
framework existed when trade dress cases first began to reach
federal appellate courts.
Despite the absence of legislative guidance, federal courts
eventually imposed a significant restriction on the protection
available under trade dress law.' As Learned Hand noted in
1917:
[Tihe plaintiff has the right not to lose his customers through
false representations that those are his wares which in fact are not,
but he may not monopolize any design or pattern, however trifling.
The defendant, on the other hand, may copy the plaintiff's goods
slavishly down to the minutest detail; but he may not represent
47. Pursuant to Pub. L. No. 93-596, 88 Stat. 1949 (1975) (codified at 15
U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 and in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C. (1994)), the office of
"Commissioner of Patents" became the "Commissioner of Patents and
Trademarks," with the "Patent Office" similarly becoming the "Patent and
Trademark Office." For the sake of convenience, this Article uses the
terminology established by contemporary law.
48. Act of Mar. 19, 1920, ch. 104, 41 Stat. 533.
49. Section 3 of the 1920 Act provided:
That any person who shall willfully and with intent to deceive,
affix, apply, or annex, or use in connection with any article or articles
of merchandise, or any container or containers of the same, a false
designation of origin, ... shall be liable at law to an action for
damages and to an action in equity for an injunction.
41 Stat. at 534.
50. As Justice Stevens has explained:
Section 3 [of the 1920 Act] was destined for oblivion largely
because it referred only to false designation of origin, was limited to
articles of merchandise, thus excluding services, and required a
showing that the use of the false designation of origin occurred
"willfully and with intent to deceive." As a result, "[a]lmost no
reported decision can be found in which relief was granted to either a
United States or foreign party based on this newly created remedy."
Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2753, 2762 n.2 (1992) (Stevens,
J., concurring) (citations omitted).
51. See JAMES L. HOPKINS, THE LAW OF TRADEMARKS, TRADENAMES AND
UNFAIR COMPETITION § 47, at 112 (2d ed. 1905) ("It is obvious that if a
commercial article itself could constitute a trademark, there would be little use
for patent laws. As Judge Carpenter said, 'in the very nature of the case,...
the trademark must be something other than, and separate from, the
merchandise.'" (quoting Davis v. Davis, 27 F. 490, 492 (C.C.D. Mass. 1886)).
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himself as the plaintiff in their sale. 2
By 1941, this doctrine applied to more than the product configu-
ration context addressed by Hand. Indeed, it encompassed a
general right to copy all functional aspects of a plaintiffs trade
dress not covered by a utility patent:
[The appropriation of a competitor's unpatented improvements]
is one of the privileges of our system of competitive enterprise. It
insures to the public the benefit of all natural, useful progress in the
industrial and commercial arts. Any article, structure or design, which
is unpatented, may accordingly be imitated or appropriated in its
functional aspects, if no unfair competition [e.g., palming off] is
involved in the manner of its use.... In permitting unpatented
functional features to be subjected to competitive commercial appro-
priation, the law treats a non-fimctional aspect of goods as constituting
in effect a mere form of merchandising or a business method.63
Moreover, the exclusion of functional trade dress from federal
protection extended to the registration process:54 not only did
52. Crescent Tool Co. v. Kilborn & Bishop Co., 247 F. 299, 301 (2d Cir.
1917). The Seventh Circuit offered an alternative statement of Hand's test in
William H. Keller, Inc. v. Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co., 298 F. 52 (7th Cir. 1923),
cert. denied, 265 U.S. 593 (1924), in the context of a defendant's copying of an
article covered by an expired utility patent:
[]f the structure which the patentee makes pursuant to his patent
is an embodiment of the elements of the claims or a claim therein, and
contains no artistic or distinguishing marks, but is strictly a utilitarian
article, where simplicity of structure and cheapened cost of production
are inherent in the combination and constitute its virtue, then the
mere fact that a Chinese copy is made does not impose on the maker
the burden of establishing his good faith or the absence of unfair trade
methods.
Id. at 57.
53. J.C. Penney Co. v. H.D. Lee Mercantile Co., 120 F.2d 949, 953-54 (8th
Cir. 1941); see also American Safety Table Co. v. Schreiber, 269 F.2d 255, 272
(2d Cir.) ("The Congress ... has therefore confined and limited the rewards of
originality to those situations and circumstances comprehended by our patent,
copyright, and trade-mark laws. When these statutory frameworks are
inapplicable, originality is per se unprotected and often unrewarded."), cert.
denied, 361 U.S. 915 (1959); West Point Mfg. Co. v. Detroit Stamping Co., 222
F.2d 581, 589 (6th Cir.) ("The identical imitation of the goods of another does
not in itself constitute unfair competition."), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 840 (1955).
54. Under the Lanham Act, federal registration of a trade dress on the
United States Patent and Trademark Office's Principal Register can provide the
registrant with important procedural and substantive advantages in an
infringement lawsuit. Federal registrants, for example, enjoy nationwide
constructive notice of their use and ownership of the underlying trade dress.
15 U.S.C. § 1072 (1994). Of equal importance, prior to the fifth anniversary of
the issuance of a registration, the registration is prima facie evidence of the
registrant's exclusive right to use the trade dress in interstate commerce, as
well as of the validity of the trade dress as an indicator of origin. Id.
§§ 1057(b), 1115(a). After five years, and provided that the registrant complies
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the Commissioner of Patents routinely deny trade dress
registration to functional product configurations, but enthusias-
tic courts generally upheld these refusals.55
Critically, courts made little effort to provide the
nonfunctionality requirement with statutory or doctrinal
moorings. Hand, for example, rested his application of the
requirement on the ambiguous theory that "all the features of
beauty or utility [of the plaintiff's good] which commend them to
the public are by hypothesis already in the public domain.""
Indeed, even after the 1946 enactment of the Lanham Act, the
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals admitted that its practice
of upholding refusals by the Patent and Trademark Office to
register functional configurations had no express textual
basis.57 The court nevertheless justified this practice under the
extra-statutory theory that "the 1946 Act is premised on the idea
that only nonfunctional configurations may be registrable there-
under."5"
The basis of the nonfunctionality doctrine became even more
uncertain because explications of it by federal courts occurred
with certain procedural formalities, these evidentiary presumptions can become
"conclusive." Id. §§ 1065, 1115(b); see Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park and Fly,
Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 196 (1985).
55. See, e.g., Sparklets Corp. v. Walter Kidde Sales Co., 104 F.2d 396, 399-
400 (C.C.P.. 1939) (grooved band on liquid gas container); In re Winchester
Repeating Arms Co., 69 F.2d 567, 568 (C.C.PA. 1934) (colored shift button on
double-barreled shotgun); In re Vertex Hosiery Mills, Inc., 45 F.2d 249, 249-50
(C.C.P.A. 1930) (ridged pattern in hosiery to inhibit runs); In re Dennison Mfg.
Co., 39 F.2d 720, 720-21 (C.C.P.A. 1930) (urn-shaped tag on clothing); Goodyear
Tire & Rubber Co. v. Robertson, 25 F.2d 833, 834-35 (4th Cir. 1928) (diamond-
shaped tire tread); Sheaffer Pen Co. v. Coe, 27 F. Supp. 380, 381-82 (D.D.C.
1939) (ridged tip of fountain pen).
56. Crescent Tool Co., 247 F. at 300.
57. See In re Deister Concentrator Co., 289 F.2d 496, 501 (C.C.P.A. 1961).
Perhaps significantly, the Patent and Trademark Office itself has acknowledged
the lack of express statutory authorization for this practice:
If something is dejure functional, it cannot be registered on either
the Principal Register or the Supplemental Register. The refusal [to
register] made in such a situation is based on §§1, 2 and 45 of the
Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. §§1051, 1052 and 1127, on the ground that
the matter does not function as a mark. The refusal rests, however,
upon the foundation of effective competition .... Thus, the refusal has
more to do with public policy than it has to do with §§1, 2 and 45 of the
Act.
PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, UNITED STATES DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
TRADEMARK MANUAL OF EXAMINING PROCEDURE ("TMEP") § 1202.03(a)(i)(C), at
1202-5 (1993).
58. In re Shenango Ceramics, Inc., 362 F.2d 287, 292 (C.C.P.A. 1966).
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almost exclusively in cases involving expired utility patents.5 9
As the Supreme Court noted in reversing an injunction against
the copying of a product configuration in Singer Manufacturing
Co. v. June Manufacturing Co.,60 "[ilt is self evident that on the
expiration of a patent the monopoly created by it ceases to exist,
and the right to make the thing formerly covered by the patent
becomes public property."6 Under this rule, "[slharing in the
goodwill of an article unprotected by patent or trade-mark is the
exercise of a right possessed by all-and in the free exercise of
which the consuming public is deeply interested."62 Thus,
before the Court's 1964 announcement of the Sears-Compco
doctrine, courts generally understood functionality as a mere
negative implication, dependent on the metes and bounds of
federal utility patent law.63
B. THE SEARS-COMPCO DoCTRNE
1. The Constitution and Functional Designs
The refusal of federal courts, for whatever reason, to protect
putative trade dresses consisting of functional product configura-
tions did not go unnoticed by the states. Although many states
originally imposed a nonfunctionality requirement as strict as
that applied by federal courts," this rule soon eroded in favor
of increased protection without apparent regard to functional-
ity.6' This tendency led, for example, to the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts extending protection to the shape of a
59. See, e.g., William H. Keller, Inc. v. Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co., 298 F.
52, 57 (7th Cir. 1923) ("The entry of one manufacturer into the field at the
expiration of [a] patent is perfectly legitimate and justifiable."), cert. denied, 265
U.S. 593 (1924).
60. 163 U.S. 169 (1896).
61. Id. at 185.
62. Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 122 (1938).
63. See also Marvel Co. v. Pearl, 133 F. 160, 161 (2d Cir. 1904) ("In the
absence of protection by patent, no person can monopolize or appropriate to the
exclusion of others elements of mechanical construction which are essential to
the successful practical operation of a manufacture, or which primarily serve to
promote its efficiency for the purpose to which it is devoted.").
64. See, e.g., Candee, Swan & Co. v. Deere & Co., 54 Ill. 439, 461 (1870)
("[The inventors of a plow] have no patent upon any portion of their plows; any
one, therefore, has a perfect right to make plows in their exact similitude, even
to 'the curve of the mould board' and 'the tip of the handles'--in the minutest,
as well as in the most important points .... ").
65. See, e.g., Weinstock, Lubin & Co. v. Marks, 42 P. 142, 145 (Cal. 1895)
(enjoining the use of putatively distinctive building design).
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loaf of bread,6" while the Georgia common law supported an
injunction against the defendant's use of (presumably functional)
"glacine paper" for its packaging.67
Of greatest importance, however, it also led to the Seventh
Circuit's application of Illinois law to product configurations that
ultimately produced the Sears-Compco doctrine. Sears, Roebuck
& Co. v. Stiffel Co.6" and Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting,
Inc.69 each involved appeals from holdings by the Seventh
Circuit that the defendants' copying of unpatented lighting
fixtures was actionable under Illinois unfair competition law.7"
Both cases presented apparently intentional copying of designs
originally covered by patents but left unprotected by federal law
after the patents' invalidation.7 In each, the Supreme Court
reversed the Seventh Circuit, holding that state protection under
these circumstances impermissibly conflicted with federal policy.
The decisions differed, however, in the means used to
achieve this end. Noting that the Intellectual Property Clause
was meant to supersede the haphazard grant of monopolies by
the states,72 the Sears Court held that passage of the federal
patent laws preempted any state action in the area under the
Supremacy Clause.73 Applying this rule to the facts before it,
the Court concluded that "j]ust as a State cannot encroach upon
the federal patent laws directly, it cannot, under some other law,
such as that forbidding unfair competition, give protection of a
kind that clashes with the federal patent laws."74
Notwithstanding the Court's reliance on the Supremacy
Clause in Sears, its decision on the same day in Compco made
66. George G. Fox Co. v. Hathaway, 85 N.E. 417, 418 (Mass. 1908).
67. See Huston v. Barrett, 142 S.E. 736, 738 (Ga. 1928).
68. 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
69. 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
70. Sears, 376 U.S. at 227; Compco, 376 U.S. at 236.
71. In both cases, the plaintiffs had secured design patents covering their
configurations, while the plaintiff in Sears also had received a utility patent.
Each, however, was invalidated at the district court level. See Sears, 376 U.S.
at 225-26; Compco, 376 U.S. at 234-35.
72. Sears, 376 U.S. at 229-30.
73. Id. at 230-31. The Supremacy Clause, U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2,
mandates the invalidation, on preemption grounds, of any state law whose
enforcement "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the
full purposes and objectives of Congress." Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67
(1941).
74. Sears, 376 U.S. at 231.
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no reference whatsoever to that provision.7 5 Rather, in reach-
ing the same result, namely that state law could not prohibit the
copying of unpatented articles, the Compco Court concluded that
"[t]o forbid copying would interfere with the federal policy, found
in Art. I, § 8, cl. 8, of the Constitution and in the implementing
federal statutes, of allowing free access to copy whatever the
federal patent and copyright laws leave in the public domain."76
By linking its holding directly to the Intellectual Property
Clause, Compco recognized a constitutional foundation for the
right to copy product configurations, with liability possible only
if a defendant's labeling failed to eliminate the risk of confusion
caused by its copying of distinctive nonfunctional elements of the
plaintiff's design.77
Compco's analysis, however, did not stop with a recognition
of the right to copy as a mandate of the nation's organic law.
Rather, by directly applying a restriction found in Article I of the
Constitution to the states, the Court reached a second constitu-
tional holding that became the focus of most subsequent
treatment of the decision. Had the Court meant to limit its
holding to a statement on federal-state relations, the obvious
75. Compco's omission of any reference to the Supremacy Clause often is
overlooked by courts and commentators alike. See, e.g., Kohler Co. v. Moen Inc.,
12 F.3d 632, 640 (7th Cir. 1993) ("[No Lanham Act issue was raised in either
Sears or Compco; the decision in each case was based on the Supremacy
Clause."); Time Mechanisms, Inc. v. Qonaar Corp., 422 F. Supp. 905,911 (D.N.J.
1976) ("The focus of both Sears and Compco... was the Supremacy Clause of
the Constitution .... ."); Jay Dratler, Jr., Trademark Protection for Industrial
Designs, 1988 U. ILL. L. REV. 887, 919 ("[T]he [Sears and Compco] decisions
involved no issue of federal trademark law; they were based strictly on the
supremacy clause." (footnote omitted)); Dan Rosen, A Common Law for the Ages
of Intellectual Property, 38 U. MIAMI L. REv. 769, 776 (1984) ("In both [Sears
and Compco], the Court concluded that the supremacy clause of the Consti-
tution prevented states from contradicting the federal intellectual property
laws."); Gary Schuman, Trademark Protection of Container and Package
Configurations-A Primer, 59 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 779, 792 (1983) ("The focus of
both Sears and Compco was the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution...
76. 376 U.S. at 237 (emphasis added).
77. See id. at 238. The efficacy of labeling as a means for reducing
confusion in the marketplace since has been the subject of debate. Compare
Bose Corp. v. Linear Design Labs., Inc., 467 F.2d 304, 310 (2d Cir. 1972)
("[Tihere is hardly likelihood of confusion or palming off when the name of the
manufacturer is clearly displayed.") with T & T Mfg. Co. v. A.T. Cross Co., 449
F. Supp. 813, 822-23 (D.R.I.) (disparaging use of disclaimers generally and
noting that in trade dress context in particular "[dlisplay of the infringer's name
... is least likely to avoid confusion when the infringement involves the design
of the item itself and not the package or the tradename"), affd, 587 F.2d 533
(1st Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 908 (1979).
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analysis would have been to hold, as the Court did in Sears, that
the incompatibility of the state laws with federal patent laws
rendered the former void under the Supremacy Clause."'
Indeed, in light of the Court's practice of avoiding direct
constitutional conflicts, such an approach might be expected. 9
Yet, the Compco Court skirted this analysis and instead ex-
pressly rested the outcome on the Supremacy Clause's far more
obscure cousin, the Intellectual Property Clause.
In contrast to classic preemption cases, therefore, a holding
of invalidity under the Constitution did not necessarily turn on
the prior congressional passage of a federal statute8° having
national effect under the Supremacy Clause. In this departure,
Compco's second holding invalidated the state policies at issue
not merely because they conflicted with a federal statutory
regime, but because their limits on the copying of functional
features violated the Constitution itself.8 ' At first blush,
78. To the extent that the relevant state laws imposed an inordinate burden
on interstate commerce, the Court might also have relied upon the Commerce
Clause in reaching its result. See generally Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc.,
359 U.S. 520, 529-30 (1959) (invalidating state law requiring use of contoured
mudguards on trucks as impermissible burden on interstate commerce).
79. See American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382,407 (1950)
("[It] is the duty of this Court to construe a statute so as to avoid the danger of
unconstitutionality if it may be done in consonance with the legislative
purpose."); see also United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106, 120-21 (1948) ("The
obligation rests also upon this Court in construing congressional enactments to
take care to interpret them so as to avoid a danger of unconstitutionality.");
United States v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366, 407 (1909) ("[Ihf the
statute be reasonably susceptible of two interpretations... it is our plain duty
to adopt that construction which will save the statute from constitutional
infirmity.").
80. For an explanation of this interpretation of Sears-Compco, see EDMUND
W. KITcH & HARvEY S. PERLMAN, LEGAL REGULATION OF THE COMPETITIVE
PROCEss 48 (3d ed. 1986). These commentators have noted the Sears Court's
decision not merely to extend the rule stated in such cases as Singer Manufac-
turing Co. v. June Manufacturing Co., 163 U.S. 169 (1896) and Kellogg Co. v.
National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111 (1938), namely that the expiration of a utility
patent leaves the underlying technology open for misappropriation:
The Court could have simply extended that position to designs
covered by invalid as well as expired patents on the theory that the act
of obtaining a patent constituted a dedication of the disclosure of the
patent to public use. But the Court in its discussion put no weight on
the fact that there was an invalid patent covering the pole lamp.
Rather the Court relied upon the existence of the patent system itself
without regard to whether the particular design had been patented.
KITCH & PERLMAN, supra, at 48.
81. As the Fifth Circuit noted in an application of Compco's second holding,
'lit runs counter to federal purposes, and perhaps borders on the unconstitu-
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therefore, Compco's direct application to the states of a constitu-
tional restriction appeared nothing less than a commercial law
equivalent of the Court's "incorporation" of selected provisions of
the Bill of Rights into the Due Process Clause. 2
Significantly, the Warren Court's next substantive treatment
of the Intellectual Property Clause left little doubt that Compco's
first holding-that the Constitution contains affirmative
restrictions on the scope of protection available to functional
configurations-was not inadvertent. Two years after Sears and
Compco, in Graham v. John Deere Co.,8" the Court addressed
the utility patent statute restricting federal protection to
nonobvious inventions.8 4 Declining simply to interpret the
statute, however, the Court prefaced its holding of invalidity by
observing that the Intellectual Property Clause "is both a grant
of power and a limitation. ... The Congress in the exercise of
the patent power may not overreach the restraints imposed by
the stated constitutional purpose. Nor may it enlarge the patent
monopoly without regard to the innovation, advancement or
tional, for a state to prolong or to create any trade monopoly to an originator by
forbidding the production of copies under the rubric of unfair competition." B.H.
Bunn Co. v. AAA Replacement Parts Co., 451 F.2d 1254, 1258-59 (5th Cir. 1971)
(emphasis added).
82. Although, like the Intellectual Property Clause, the Bill of Rights on its
face applies only to the federal government, the Supreme Court, beginning in
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937), expressly has held that certain
provisions of the first eight amendments apply to the states through their
"incorporation" into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See,
e.g., Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947) (applying First
Amendment Establishment Clause to states through the Fourteenth Amend-
ment). Viewed in light of the Warren Court's acceleration of this process in the
early 1960s, Compco's direct reference to the Intellectual Property Clause as a
ground for the invalidation of a state practice, rather than to the interplay of
a federal statute and the Supremacy Clause, is hardly surprising. See, e.g.,
Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403-06 (1965) (Sixth Amendment right to
confront witnesses); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 3 (1964) (Fifth Amendment
right against self-incrimination); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339-45
(1963) (Sixth Amendment right to counsel); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S.
660, 667 (1962) (Eighth Amendment protection against cruel and unusual
punishment); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 650-53 (1961) (Fourth Amendment
protection against unreasonable search and seizure).
83. 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
84. The statute provides for the rejection of applications if "the subject
matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter
as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a
person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains."
35 U.S.C. § 103 (1994).
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social benefit gained thereby."5 Graham therefore provided
the federal law counterpart to Compco's application of the
Intellectual Property Clause.
2. Post-Compco Erosion of the Direct Application of the
Intellectual Property Clause to the States
Unfortunately, the continued significance to federal law of
both Compco's first constitutional holding and the Court's
observations in Graham largely has been obscured by the Court's
ultimate rejection of the second step of the Compco analysis,
namely the direct application of a constitutional nonfunctionality
requirement to state unfair competition law. The Court began
to back off Compco's theory of the Intellectual Property Clause
as an affirmative bar to state protection of intellectual property
rights in Goldstein v. California,86 decided nearly a decade after
Sears and Compco" In Goldstein, the Court confronted a state
statute criminalizing the piracy of sound recordings, which were
then not covered by federal copyright law.8" The Goldstein
petitioners challenged the statute's validity under a variety of
theories, including a statutory preemption claim of the sort
adopted in Sears.89 They also, however, advanced a claim
grounded in Compco's second constitutional holding, namely that
the state legislation directly conflicted with the Intellectual
Property Clause itself.9"
The Court dismissed this latter argument, but did so in a
manner that left fully intact Compco's first constitutional
holding. With respect to the constitutional preemption
85. 383 U.S. at 5-6 (emphasis added).
86. 412 U.S. 546 (1973).
87. This retreat was perhaps signaled by dictum in Justice Harlan's opinion
for the Court in Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 (1969), to the effect that,
Sears and Compco notwithstanding, the states retained the power to enforce a
royalty agreement for an unpatentable invention during the pendency of a
patent application. See id. at 674-75 (dictum).
88. During the pendency of the state criminal proceedings under the state
statute that led to the convictions of the petitioners in Goldstein, Congress
amended the federal copyright laws to encompass unauthorized copying of
sound recordings. See Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391 (1971). The effective
date of the federal amendments, however, did not sweep the petitioners'
activities within the scope of federal law. See 412 U.S. at 551-52.
89. 412 U.S. at 551.
90. See id.
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claims,9 the Court concluded that "[t]he clause of the Constitu-
tion granting to Congress the power to issue copyrights does not
provide that such power shall vest exclusively in the Federal
Government. Nor does the Constitution expressly provide that
such power shall not be exercised by the States."92 Signifi-
cantly, however, the Goldstein Court did not question the
proposition that the Intellectual Property Clause contains
substantive restrictions as well as enumerated powers, but
instead concluded only that "whatever limitations have been
appended to such powers can only be understood as a limit on
congressional, and not state, action."93
This trend continued in the Court's next opinion to address
the issue, Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp.94 Unlike the product
configurations at issue in Sears and Compco and the sound
recordings in Goldstein, Kewanee addressed the constitutional
limits on state protection of trade secrets.95 The subject of the
litigation was an Ohio statute criminalizing the misappro-
priation of trade secrets, which the Sixth Circuit held was
legislatively preempted by federal patent laws," creating a split
with the Second, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits.
9 7
91. As to the petitioners' statutory claims, the Court concluded that, unlike
the federal patent regime addressed by Sears and Compco, the then-extant
copyright act did not expressly provide for the ineligibility for protection of the
pirated goods. In the absence of such statutory guidance, the Court held that
federal copyright statutes were not so pervasively broad that they precluded the
states from protecting the materials at issue. Id. at 561-70.
92. Id. at 553.
93. Id. at 560 (emphasis added).
94. 416 U.S. 470 (1974).
95. Under the definition accepted by the Kewanee Court:
A trade secret may consist of any formula, pattern, device or
compilation of information which is used in one's business, and which
gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors who
do not know or use it. It may be a formula for a chemical compound,
a process of manufacturing, treating or preserving materials, a pattern
for a machine or other device, or a list of customers.
Id. at 474-75 (quoting RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939)).
96. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 478 F.2d 1074 (6th Cir. 1973), rev'd,
416 U.S. 470 (1974). Curiously, although ultimately framing its discussion in
statutory preemption terms, the Sixth Circuit opened its discussion with the
observation that "there is a very serious and important issue of a claimed
conflict with the provisions of the Constitution of the United States relating to
Patents, Article I, Section 8 (Clause 8)." Id. at 1078.
97. In respective order, See Painton & Co. v. Bourns, Inc., 442 F.2d 216 (2d
Cir. 1971); Servo Corp. of Am. v. General Elec. Co., 337 F.2d 716 (4th Cir. 1964),
cert. denied, 383 U.S. 934 (1966); Water Servs., Inc. v. Tesco Chems., Inc., 410
F.2d 163 (5th Cir. 1969); Dekar Indus. v. Bissett-Berman Corp., 434 F.2d 1304
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In overturning this result, the Supreme Court employed
much the same analysis as it had in Goldstein. The Court began
with the premise that "[tihe only limitation on the States is that
in regulating the area of patents and copyrights they do not
conflict with the operation of the laws in this area passed by
Congress .. ,,." The Court concluded that the state legislation
afforded a lower degree of protection than did the utility patent
statutes and therefore did not conflict with federal law.99
Moreover, and in contrast to its holding in Sears that the
pervasiveness of federal patent law in and of itself preempted
state protection, the Kewanee Court relied on the absence of an
express preemptive intent by Congress. °0
The Court retreated still further from Compco's constitu-
tional preemption analysis in Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil
Co.'° ' Aronson arose from the Eighth Circuit's invalidation of
a license covering a device for which the Patent and Trademark
Office had denied a utility patent.0 2 The Supreme Court
reversed, however, citing three general principles of "federal
patent law" that were not expressly grounded either in the
Intellectual Property Clause, the Supremacy Clause, or any
federal statute:
First, patent law seeks to foster and reward invention; second, it
promotes disclosure of inventions to stimulate further innovation and
to permit the public to practice the invention once the patent expires;
third, the stringent requirements for patent protection seek to assure
that ideas in the public domain remain there for the free use of the
public.
10 3
The death knell of constitutional preemption occurred in
Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., °4 a decision
that, ironically, reaffirmed Compco's first constitutional holding.
In the wake-of Goldstein and Kewanee, most courts and commen-
tators not only disparaged the Intellectual Property Clause as
anything but a grant of powers, but even disregarded the
(9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 945 (1971).
98. 416 U.S. at 479.
99. See id. at 490 ("Where patent law acts as a barrier, trade secret law
functions relatively as a sieve.").
100. See id. at 493 ("Congress, by its silence over these many years, has seen
the wisdom of allowing the States to enforce trade secret protection.").
101. 440 U.S. 257 (1979).
102. Quick Point Pencil Co. v. Aronson, 567 F.2d 757, 762 (8th Cir. 1977),
rev'd, 440 U.S. 257 (1979).
103. 440 U.S. at 262.
104. 489 U.S. 141 (1989).
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statutory preemption analysis found in Sears.'°5 An exception
to this rule, however, was the Florida Supreme Court, which in
1987 held its state's prohibition against direct molding in the
boat industry preempted by federal law."°6
In affirming the Florida Supreme Court and disapproving
the Federal Circuit's contrary interpretation of a similar
California statute,0 7 the Bonito Boats Court adopted an ap-
proach that diverged from Compco's treatment of the Intellectual
Property Clause. Addressing the preemption question, the Court
105. See, e.g., Brunswick Corp. v. Spinit Reel Co., 832 F.2d 513, 526 n.7
(10th Cir. 1987) (declining to apply Sears-Compco on ground that states clearly
retain "the ability to prohibit infringement of ... trade dress indicating a
product's origin"); Truck Equip. Serv. Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., 536 F.2d 1210,
1214 (8th Cir.) (characterizing preemptive statements in Sears and Compco as
"dictum"), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 861 (1976); see also 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY,
TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 7:25, at 232-33 (2d ed. 1984) ("[Ilt is
difficult to discern exactly what, if anything, is left of Sears-Compco policy.");
Robert C. Denicola, Applied Art and Industrial Design: A Suggested Approach
to Copyright in Useful Articles, 67 MINN. L. REV. 707, 724 n.88 (1983) ("With
surprising pluck, several courts have simply rejected the rationale of Sears and
Compco and continued to offer protection under state unfair competition law.");
Dratler, supra note 75, at 917 (noting that "many lower couts [sic] refuse to
construe the SearsICompco decisions broadly; some have distinguished them,
and others have virtually ignored them"); Beverly W. Pattishall, The Lanham
Trademark Act-Its Impact Over Four Decades, 76 TRADEMARK REP. 193, 206
(1986) ("[Djuring the twenty-one years since Sears and Compco, nearly all of the
law that has referred to their doctrine has effectively diminished rather than
enlarged their scope.").
106. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 515 So. 2d 220, 223
(Fla. 1987), affd, 489 U.S. 141 (1989).
Although undefined by the United States Supreme Court's opinion in Bonito
Boats, "[d]irect molding is a form of reverse engineering that employs a mold or
cast to effect quick and inexpensive duplication of a product." Paul Heald,
Federal Intellectual Property Law and the Economics of Preemption, 76 IOwA L.
REV. 959, 960 n.10 (1991). At the time of oral argument in Bonito Boats, at
least 11 states had statutes addressing the practice. David E. Shipley, Refusing
to Rock the Boat: The Sears/Compco Preemption Doctrine Applied to Bonito
Boats v. Thunder Craft, 25 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 385, 392 n.63 (1990).
107. See Interpart Corp. v. Italia, 777 F.2d 678 (Fed. Cir. 1985). The
Interpart court upheld the direct molding statute before it on the ground that
"[t]he statute prevents unscrupulous competitors from obtaining a product and
using it as the 'plug' for making a mold.... [T]he patent laws 'say nothing
about the right to copy or the right to use, they speak only in terms of the right
to exclude.' "Id. at 685 (quoting Mine Safety Appliances Co. v. Electric Storage
Battery Co., 405 F.2d 901, 902 n.2 (C.C.P.A. 1969)). After the Federal Circuit's
decision in Interpart, but before the Supreme Court's decision in Bonito Boats,
a California state appellate panel relied on the Federal Circuit's holding to
similar effect in concluding that the California plug-molding statute was not
preempted by federal patent law. See Gladstone v. Hillel, 250 Cal. Rptr. 372,
378-79 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988).
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employed a statutory, rather than a constitutional, analysis in
holding the Florida statute fatally incompatible with federal
patent laws and therefore invalid under the Supremacy
Clause.'0 8 Indeed, Bonito Boats closed the door on an issue
that the Court's post-Compco decisions had not expressly
resolved, namely whether the Intellectual Property Clause
operates as an affirmative restriction on state action:
Our decisions since Sears and Compco have made it clear that the
Patent and Copyright Clauses do not, by their own force or by negative
implication, deprive the States of the power to adopt rules for the
promotion of intellectual creation within their ownjurisdictions. Thus,
where Congress determines that neither federal protection nor freedom
from restraint is required by the national interest, the States remain
free to promote originality and creativity in their own domains."°
Although finalizing the Court's retreat from Compco's
constitutional preemption analysis, Bonito Boats did nothing in
conflict with either Compco's other constitutional holding or the
Court's observations in Graham, namely that the Intellectual
Property Clause contains substantive restrictions on the federal
protection available to functional configurations. Indeed, the
Court went so far as to cite with approval Compco's statement
of nonfunctionality as a constitutional, rather than a statutory,
requirement, 0 and was equally careful to reaffirm that "the
Clause contains both a grant of power and certain limitations
upon the exercise of that power.""' Whatever the continuing
viability of preemption under Article I, the principle that it is
"implicit in the [Intellectual Property] Clause itself[] that free
exploitation of ideas will be the rule, to which the protection of
a federal patent is the exception,""2 remains alive and well
even after the Court's retreat from Compco's second holding.
108. 489 U.S. at 165-68.
109. Id. at 165 (quotations and citations omitted).
110. See id. at 153. The Court explained its reasons for having invalidated
the application of state law at issue in Compco:
With some notable exceptions, including the interpretation of the
Illinois law of unfair competition at issue in Sears and Compco, the
common-law tort of unfair competition has been limited to protection
against copying of nonfunctional aspects of consumer products which
have acquired secondary meaning such that they operate as a
designation of source.
Id. at 157-58 (citations omitted and emphasis added).
111. Id. at 146 (emphasis added).
112. Id. at 151.
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3. Functionality and Federal Law in the Wake of Sears-
Compco-Bonito Boats
For the most part, federal courts hearing trade dress cases
under the Lanham Act after Sears-Compco have applied a
nonfunctionality requirement of some sort."3 Protection there-
fore will not attach to a particular design " 'if it is essential to
the use or purpose of the article or if it affects the cost or quality
of the article,' that is, if exclusive use of the feature would put
competitors at a significant non-reputation-related disadvan-
tage.""4  Under this standard, a utility patent covering a
design in which trade dress significance is alleged is very strong,
if not conclusive, evidence of functionality."5 Other relevant
113. See, e.g., Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 115 S. Ct. 1300, 1304
(1995) ("The functionality doctrine prevents trademark law, which seeks to
promote competition by protecting a firm's reputation, from instead inhibiting
legitimate competition by allowing a producer to control a useful product
feature."); Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2753, 2758 (1992) ("It
is also clear that eligibility for protection under [the Lanham Act] depends on
nonfimctionality."); see also Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844,
862-63 (1982) (White, J., concurring) ("[A] finding of functionality offers a
complete defense to [an] ... infringement claim predicated solely on the
reproduction of a fimctional attribute of the product.").
114. Qualitex, 115 S. Ct. at 1304 (quoting Inwood Labs., 456 U.S. at 850
n.10); see also RESTATEMENT, supra note 21, § 17, at 172 ("A design is
'functional'... if the design affords benefits in the manufacturing, marketing,
or use of the goods or services with which the design is used ... that are
important to effective competition by others and that are not practically
available through the use of alternative designs.").
Significantly, the fact that a particular feature performs some function is
not dispositive of functionality within the meaning of trade dress law:
[Trade dress doctrine] separates the term "functional" into two
parts, de jure and de facto, which may be distinguished, in part,
according to the degree of utility present in the design of the product.
In essence, de facto functional means that the design of a product
has a function, i.e., a bottle of any design holds fluid. De jure
functionality, on the other hand, means that the product is in its
particular shape because it works better in this shape. This distinction
is useful because the configuration of a product is not necessarily
lacking in trademark significance because of "the mere existence of
utility"; rather, it should depend on "the degree of design utility."
In re R.M. Smith Inc., 734 F.2d 1482, 1484 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (citations omitted).
115. See, e.g., In re Telesco Brophey Ltd., 170 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 427, 428
(T.T.-B. 1971) ("[A] utility patent comprehending the configuration in question
is adequate evidence to establish that the configuration is indeed functional in
character."); see also In re Bose Corp., 772 F.2d 866, 871-72 (Fed. Cir. 1985)
(buttressing a holding that the design in question was primarily utilitarian by
referring to a utility patent covering the identical configuration); In re Shenango
Ceramics, Inc., 362 F.2d 287, 291-92 (C.C.P.- 1966) (same); In re Oscar Mayer
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factors typically have included whether the design owner has
touted utilitarian advantages of its product in its advertis-
ing,116 whether acceptable alternatives exist,"7 and whether
the design results from a comparatively simple or inexpensive
method of manufacture," 8 or is necessary to conform to indus-
try standards." 9
& Co., 189 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 295, 296 (T.T.A.B. 1975) (same).
116. See, e.g., American Greetings Corp. v. Dan-Dee Imports, Inc., 807 F.2d
1136, 1142 (3d Cir. 1986) ("If the marketer of a product advertises the
utilitarian advantages of a particular feature, this constitutes strong evidence
of its functionality."); In re Morton-Norwich Prods., Inc., 671 F.2d 1332, 1341
(C.C.P.A. 1982) (holding probative of functionality that "the originator of the
design touts its utilitarian advantages through advertising"); Fisher Stoves, Inc.
v. All Nighter Stove Works, Inc., 626 F.2d 193, 195 (1st Cir. 1980) (holding
plaintiffs putative trade dress functional on showing that plaintiffs "advertising
[repeatedly and predominantly] emphasize[sl the functional nature" of its
product).
117. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 21, § 17, at 172; see also Clamp Mfg. Co.
v. Enco Mfg. Co., 870 F.2d 512, 516 (9th Cir.) (holding evidence of alternative
designs probative on issue of functionality), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 872 (1989);
In re Bose Corp., 772 F.2d 866, 872 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (same); New England Butt
Co. v. International Trade Conm'n, 756 F.2d 874, 878 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (same);
Textron, Inc. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 753 F.2d 1019, 1026 (Fed.
Cir. 1985) (noting lack of evidence that alternative designs could perform a
similar function without increased cost in upholding finding of functionality).
Perhaps significantly, the existence of alternative designs will not
necessarily dispose of a defendant's claims of functionality. See Keene Corp. v.
Paraflex Indus., Inc., 653 F.2d 822, 827 (3d Cir. 1981) ("[Mlerely because there
are other shapes and designs 'which defendant could use and still produce a
workable' product, the design used is not thereby non-functional.") (quoting
Vaughan Novelty Mfg. Co. v. G.G. Greene Mfg. Corp., 202 F.2d 172, 175 n.10
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 820 (1953)). Rather, the real inquiry is whether
the putative trade dress at issue "has been or can be designed in an alternative
manner and work as well, at an equivalent cost." Textron, 753 F.2d at 1026.
118. See, e.g., Bose Corp., 772 F.2d at 873 (finding the shape of a loudspeaker
enclosure functional largely because it conformed to the shape of the speaker's
sound matrix); see also J.R. Clark Co. v. Murray Metal Prods. Co., 219 F.2d 313,
320 (5th Cir. 1955) (holding plaintiffs putative trade dress functional because
product appearance was merely a cost-effective "result of a well known
manufacturing process").
119. See, e.g., John H. Harland Co. v. Clarke Checks, Inc., 711 F.2d 966, 984
n.31 (11th Cir. 1983) (stating that the size and shape of a check stub may be
functional "because check companies often fill reorders from consumers who
initially had obtained their check products from a competitor"); see also New
England Butt Co., 756 F.2d at 879 (finding complainant's design functional in
part on showing that the putative infringer "was compelled by competitive
necessity to copy because [its] customers ... insisted that their ... machine's
parts be interchangeable with those of [the complainant]"); Deere & Co. v.
Farmhand, Inc., 560 F. Supp. 85, 91-92 (S.D. Iowa 1982) (holding "John Deere
green" functional in light of evidence of industry preference for matching
equipment), affd, 721 F.2d 253 (8th Cir. 1983) (per curiam).
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These cases, however, have left unresolved two critical
substantive issues,12 the first of which concerns the doctrinal
underpinnings of the nonfunctionality requirement. Specifically,
most federal courts have concluded that in articulating the
Sears-Compco doctrine "the Supreme Court did not purport to
consider or decide the boundaries between federal patent law
and federal trademark law."' 2 ' The result is that a "suit
brought under ... the Lanham Act survives the stringent
limitations on state unfair competition laws imposed by the
decisions of the Supreme Court."'2 2 Having mistaken the
Court's retreat from Compco's constitutional preemption analysis
for a retreat from the substantive restrictions of the Intellectual
Property Clause recognized by that case and its progeny, these
courts have failed to address, much less to resolve, the issue of
120. In addition to the substantive issues unresolved under current trade
dress doctrine that are discussed infra at notes 121-144 and accompanying text,
a split in the circuits exists on the procedural question of which party bears the
burden of proof on the issue of functionality. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 21,
§ 17 cmt. b, at 181. For representative cases treating nonfunctionality as an
element of the plaintiff's prima facie case, see Merchant & Evans, Inc. v.
Roosevelt Bldg. Prods. Co., 963 F.2d 628, 633 (3d Cir. 1992); Ferrari S.P-.
Esercizio Fabriche Automobili E Corse v. Roberts, 944 F.2d 1235, 1239 (6th Cir.
1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 3028 (1992); Clamp Mfg. Co. v. Enco Mfg. Co., 870
F.2d 512, 516 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 872 (1989); Brooks Shoe Mfg. Co.
v. Suave Shoe Corp., 716 F.2d 854, 857 (11th Cir. 1983); Fisher Stoves, Inc. v.
All Nighter Stove Works, Inc., 626 F.2d 193, 195 (1st Cir. 1980) (dictum). Cases
treating functionality as an affirmative defense to be established by the
defendant include: Badger Meter, Inc. v. Grinnell Corp., 13 F.3d 1145, 1151 (7th
Cir. 1994); Hartford House, Ltd. v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 846 F.2d 1268, 1271
n.3 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 908 (1988); Stormy Clime Ltd. v.
ProGroup, Inc., 809 F.2d 971, 974 (2d Cir. 1987); see also Inwood Labs., Inc. v.
Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 863 (1982) (White, J., concurring)
("[F]unctionality is a defense to a suit under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act."); cf. In
re Teledyne Indus., 696 F.2d 968, 971 (Fed. Cir. 1982) (holding in context of
trademark application process that Patent and Trademark Office bears initial
burden of demonstrating functionality).
121. In re Mogen David Wine Corp., 372 F.2d 539, 543 (C.C.PA. 1967)
(Smith, J., concurring).
122. Keene Corp. v. Paraflex Indus., 653 F.2d 822, 823 n.1 (3d Cir. 1981).
As one court has explained this consensus:
The potential for conflict between the patent law and the law
governing unfair competition is further reduced by the enactment of
section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, since that federal statute represents
a congressional determination that the public should be protected from
potentially confusing or misleading indicia of source of origin, including
trade dress. The federalization of this body of law thus entirely avoids
the immediate thrust of Sears-Compco.
Lon Tai Shing Co. v. Koch + Lowy, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1081, 1107 (S.D.N.Y.
1990) (citation omitted).
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why the Lanham Act does not supersede or augment the
protection afforded to functional features under utility patent
law.'23 Although it may be true that "[iut is the province of
patent law, not trademark law, to encourage invention by
granting inventors a monopoly over new product designs or
functions for a limited time,"" it -is equally true that, as a
matter of statutory law, there is nothing to prevent Congress
from altering this balance.125
Indeed, although some courts have concluded that a
nonfinctionality requirement is necessary to prevent a statutory
clash between the utility patent and trademark laws,126 others
have been less inclined to recognize such a conflict.' Thus,
for example, in Shakespeare Co. v. Silstar Corp. of America, 28
the Fourth Circuit concluded that the Lanham Act expressly
eliminates defendants' access to the fimctionality doctrine in
certain cases involving federal trade dress registrations. 29
123. Cf Truck Equip. Serv. Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., 536 F.2d 1210, 1215 (8th
Cir.) (distinguishing protection afforded by Lanham Act from patent protection
on ground that trade dress protection "may be extended in perpetuity"), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 861 (1976).
124. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 115 S. Ct. 1300, 1304 (1995).
125. See, e.g., Picard v. United Aircraft Corp., 128 F.2d 632, 643 n.22 (2d
Cir.) (addressing, in dictum, the possibility of Congress authorizing grants of
patents to noninventors under the Commerce Clause), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 651
(1942); see also 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND
UNFAIR COMPETITION, § 7.25[4], at 7-109 to 7-111 (3d ed. 1993) (discussing
plaintiffs' ability to avoid Sears/Compco preemption issues by grounding their
claims on the Lanham Act).
126. See, e.g., W.T. Rogers Co. v. Keene, 778 F.2d 334, 337 (7th Cir. 1985)
(upholding protection of plaintiffs trade dress under Lanham Act, but noting
that "provided that a defense of functionality is recognized, there is no conflict
with federal patent law").
127. See S. Stephen Hilmy, Note, Bonito Boats' Resurrection of the
Preemption Controversy: The Patent Leverage Charade and the Lanham Act
"EndAround," 69 TEX. L. REV. 729, 754-55 (1991) ("[Tlhe lower [federal] courts
have managed, with considerable interpretive effort, to read section 43(a) of the
Lanham Act as a vehicle for accomplishing precisely what Sears-Compco had
formerly precluded, namely, prohibiting the copying and sale of unpatented and
uncopyrighted articles in the public domain." (footnotes omitted)).
128. 9 F.3d 1091 (4th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2134 (1994).
129. In Shakespeare, the plaintiff had secured a federal trade dress
registration covering the design of its fishing rod and subsequently sought to
enforce its trade dress rights against a competitor using a similar design.
Before the District Court, the defendant initially succeeded in canceling the
plaintiffs federal registration on the ground that the registration covered a
functional design. See Shakespeare Co. v. Silstar Corp. of Am., 802 F. Supp.
1386 (D.S.C. 1992), rev'd, 9 F.3d 1091 (4th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct.
2134 (1994). On appeal, however, the Fourth Circuit held that by providing
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Similarly, in Ferrari S.PA Esercizio Fabriche Automobili E
Corse v. Roberts,3 ' the Sixth Circuit examined Compco's
observation that "a defendant can copy at will if the design is
'not entitled to a design patent or other federal statutory
protection' " and concluded that the Lanham Act is just such
"other statutory protection."'' As the Ferrari court stated,
"[because trademark law and patent law address different
concerns, and because of the narrow focus of the Supreme
Court's inquiry in Compco and Sears,... these decisions do not
preclude Lanham Act protection of designs.""2 These courts'
theory of functionality would allow Congress to extend protection
to functional trade dresses outside the ambit of utility patent
law,'33 just as it had enacted the Trademark Act of 1881 and
its successors under the Commerce Clause, rather than the
Intellectual Property Clause."M
The second issue left unresolved by modern trade dress
doctrine is the extent of protection available for combinations of
nonfunctional and functional features.3 5 On the one extreme,
the apparent majority rule among the circuits is to recognize
protectable trade dress rights in overall configurations that are
certain express grounds upon which federal registrations that have passed the
fifth anniversary of their issuance "may" be canceled, section 14(3) of the
Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3) (1994), expressly excludes all others, including
the possible functionality of the underlying trade dresses. 9 F.3d at 1097 ("[I]t
... seem[s] anomalous for Congress to enumerate specific grounds for
cancellation for a five-year old registration, as it has done in § 1064, and not list
functionality, if it intended functionality to serve as such a ground."); accord
Kransco Mfg. Inc. v. Hayes Specialties Corp., 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1999, 2001
(E.D. Mich. 1994) (concluding that "functionality is not a ground upon which an
incontestable trademark can be challenged").
130. 944 F.2d 1235 (6th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 3028 (1992).
131. Id. at 1241 (quoting Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S.
234, 238 (1964)).
132. Id.
133. See A. Samuel Oddi, Consumer Motivation in Trademark and Unfair
Competition Law: On the Importance of Source, 31 VILL. L. REV. 1, 17 (1986)
("Since Sears and Compco were based on the supremacy clause of the
Constitution and federal preemption, this would still leave open the possibility
that other federal laws, not specifically preempted, could protect against product
simulation.").
134. See supra note 45 and accompanying text (noting that Congress closely
followed the Court's suggestion in The Trade-Mark Cases to base trademark
legislation on the Commerce Clause).
135. See generally 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 125, § 7.26[3][f), at 7-134 to 7-
137 (discussing trade dress law as focusing on the total image or overall
impression of a product); id. § 8.01[1], at 8-1 to 8-5 (discussing protection of the
combination of functional and nonfunctional features).
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"primarily nonfunctional."'36 Under this standard, "[w]hen the
thing claimed as trade dress or a trademark consists of a
combination of individual design features, then it is the function-
ality of the overall combination that controls."'37 In jurisdic-
tions adhering to this principle, defendants may be subject to
broad injunctions prohibiting them from copying entire articles,
even if those articles include functional elements unprotected by
utility patent law. 38
Other courts have applied a two-tiered standard for
functionality that turns on the nature of the particular trade
dress at issue. Under this rule, if a would-be plaintiff's trade
dress consists of the packaging for its product, it may include
both functional and nonfunctional components,3 9 and the
appropriate inquiry is the functionality of the trade dress as a
whole. 4 ' The standard is different, however, if a claimant
136. See, e.g., Ferrari S.P-A Esercizio Fabriche Automobili E Corse v.
Roberts, 944 F.2d 1235, 1239 (6th Cir. 1991) (requiring as an element of a claim
for trade dress infringement a showing by plaintiff "that the appropriated
features of [its] trade dress are primarily nonfunctional"), cert. denied, 112 S.
Ct. 3028 (1992); Woodsmith Publishing Co. v. Meredith Corp., 904 F.2d 1244,
1247 (8th Cir. 1990) (noting that trade dress must be primarily nonfunctional
to be eligible for protection); AmBrit, Inc. v. Kraft, Inc., 812 F.2d 1531, 1538
(11th Cir. 1986) (same), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987); see also Latica Corp.
v. Sweetheart Cup Co., 805 F. Supp. 482,485 (E.D. Mich. 1992) (same); Storck
USA, L.P. v. Farley Candy Co., 797 F. Supp. 1399, 1407 (N.D. Ill. 1992) (same).
137. 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 125, § 7.26[3][f], at 7-134; see also Hartford
House, Ltd. v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 846 F.2d 1268, 1272 (10th Cir.) ("[T]he
appropriate inquiry is not whether each individual feature of the trade dress is
functional but whether the whole collection of features, taken together, is
functional."), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 908 (1988).
138. As Learned Hand summarized this rule in a pre-Sears-Compco case,
"M[we usually confine relief to 'nonfimctional' elements, because the defendant
will suffer nothing by abandoning them; but it does not inevitably follow that
only these may be included." Wesson v. Galef, 286 F. 621, 623 (S.D.N.Y. 1922);
see also CPG Prods. Corp. v. Pegasus Luggage, Inc., 776 F.2d 1007, 1013-14
(Fed. Cir. 1985) (applying Eleventh Circuit law to uphold injunction against
entire product line); Robarb Inc. v. Pool Builders Supply, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1743, 1746 (N.D. Ga. 1991) ("Specific elements that are separately functional
and thus unprotectible can be protected as part of a trade dress which, as a
whole may be protectable.").
139. See, e.g., In re Morton-Norwich Prods., Inc., 671 F.2d 1332, 1342
(C.C.P.A. 1982) (discussing protectability of packaging that has both functional
and nonfunctional elements).
140. See In re Mogen David Wine Corp., 328 F.2d 925, 933 (C.C.P.A. 1964)
(Rich, J., concurring).
This rule presupposes that the applicant is seeking to protect the
appearance of its packaging as a trademark for the enclosed goods, rather than
for the configuration of the packaging itself. Although it is common for "[a]
624
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alleges protectable rights in the design of a product itself, as
"before an overall product configuration can be recognized as a
trademark, the entire design must be arbitrary or non de jure
fuinctional."' 4' Although this distinction originally arose in the
federal registration and import exclusion contexts,4 2 some
jurisdictions have begun to apply it in infringement litigation
involving unregistered trade dresses. 43 Carried to its limits,
this rule mandates that "unique arrangements of purely
functional features constitute a functional design not entitled as
a matter of law to protection under the Lanham Act,"' with-
out regard to whether the unique arrangements themselves are
nonfunctional.
To date, the Supreme Court has declined to provide express
guidance on this issue. In the landmark case of Two Pesos, Inc.
v. Taco Cabana, Inc.,'" the Court resolved a split in the
circuits on whether inherently distinctive trade dress could be
protected in the absence of so-called "secondary meaning" or an
trademark right [to] be claimed for the design for.., a glass container insofar
as it has acquired distinctiveness by the use with respect to particular goods,
for instance, beverages or perfumes," designers of putatively unique packaging
often seek to protect their creations without regard to contents. II STEPHEN P.
LADAS, PATENTS, TRADEMARK, AND RELATED RIGHTS: NATIONAL AND INTERNA-
TIONAL PROTECTION § 489, at 843 (1975).
141. Textron, Inc. v. United States Int'l Trade Conm'n, 753 F.2d 1019, 1025
(Fed. Cir. 1985); accord Petersen Mfg. Co. v. Central Purchasing, Inc., 740 F.2d
1541, 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (stating that an overall design is not protectable,
i.e., non de jure functional, merely because it includes some arbitrary features).
142. See, e.g., Textron, 753 F.2d at 1025 (import exclusion litigation under
19 U.S.C. § 1337); In re Vico Prods. Mfg. Co., 229 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 364, 368
(T.T.A.B. 1985) (trade dress registration context).
143. See, e.g., Clamp Mfg. Co. v. Enco Mfg. Co., 870 F.2d 512, 516 (9th Cir.)
("For an overall product configuration to be recognized as a trademark, the
entire design must be nonfunctional."), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 872 (1989); Ohio
Art Co. v. Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc., 799 F. Supp. 870, 884 (N.D. Ill. 1992) ("For
this court to recognize the overall product configuration of the [plaintiffs] toy
as a trademark, the entire design must be arbitrary or nonfunctional."); Tenax
Corp. v. Tensar Corp., 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1881, 1888-89 (D. Md. 1991) (same).
Thus, under these cases, a plaintiff must prove that the particular features
allegedly copied by the defendant are nonfunctional. See, e.g., Gale Group, Inc.
v. King City Indus. Co., 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1208, 1212 (M.D. Fla. 1992)
(holding that although the individual parts of plaintiffs product each had a
functional purpose, the distinctive arrangement of certain parts within the
product provided a "total image" that was not entirely functional).
144. Rachel v. Banana Republic, Inc., 831 F.2d 1503, 1506 (9th Cir. 1987)
(citations and quotations omitted).
145. 112 S. Ct. 2753 (1992).
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acquired distinctiveness as an indicator of origin. 4 6 Although
holding that inherently distinctive trade dresses are entitled to
protection immediately upon adoption, 4 7 the Two Pesos Court
146. See supra note 23 and accompanying text (describing the distinctiveness
requirement for trade dress protection).
Prior to the Supreme Court's opinion in Two Pesos, the Fifth and Eleventh
Circuits had been the most strident advocates of the protection of inherently
distinctive trade dress. See, e.g., AmBrit, Inc. v. Kraft, Inc., 812 F.2d 1531,
1535 (11th Cir. 1986) (affirming finding that plaintiffs trade dress was
inherently distinctive and therefore protectable in the absence of secondary
meaning on the ground that "the ... trade dress is not a basic shape of common
design"), cert. denied, 481 U.S; 1041 (1987); Chevron Chem. Co. v. Voluntary
Purchasing Groups, Inc., 659 F.2d 695, 702 (5th Cir. Unit A 1981) ("If the
features of the trade dress sought to be protected are arbitrary... there is no
reason to require a plaintiff to show consumer connotations associated with
such arbitrarily selected features."), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1126 (1982). In
contrast, the Second Circuit had long required a demonstration of secondary
meaning for all trade dresses, without consideration of the extent to which they
might be inherently distinctive. See LeSportsac, Inc. v. K Mart Corp., 754 F.2d
71, 75 (2d Cir. 1985); Vibrant Sales, Inc. v. New Body Boutique, Inc., 652 F.2d
299, 303-04 (2d Cir. 1981) (noting that because the section of the Lanham Act
covering trade dress, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a), is the only section of the Act not
limited to registered marks, a plaintiff seeking to protect an unregistered trade
dress must show secondary meaning to secure relief), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 909
(1982).
147. Two Pesos, 112 S. Ct. at 2758-59. Perhaps significantly, certain courts
and commentators have concluded that this principle is entitled to reduced force
in cases involving putative trade dress in (presumably primarily functional)
product configurations. See, e.g., Duraco Prods., Inc. v. Joy Plastic Enters., 40
F.3d 1431, 1450 (3d Cir. 1994) ("Protecting a product configuration without a
showing of secondary meaningbecause the configuration is pleasant rather than
because it identifies the source of the product would risk seriously transgressing
the protective zones mapped by the patent laws."); Kohler Co. v. Moen Inc., 12
F.3d 632, 641 n.11 (7th Cir. 1993) ("The only distinction courts make between
trade dress generally and product configuration cases in particular is to require
plaintiffs asserting [the latter] to prove secondary meaning because a product's
shape is never inherently distinctive."); In re DC Comics, Inc., 689 F.2d 1042,
1050-51 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (Nies, J., concurring) (stating that a product design
must be distinctive as an indication of origin, not simply distinctive in the sense
of being unusual). As the Restatement has explained, "[ais a practical matter,
... it is less common for consumers to recognize the design of a product or
product feature as an indication of source.. .. Product designs are more likely
to be seen merely as utilitarian or ornamental aspects of the goods." RESTATE-
MENT, supra note 21, § 16 cmt. b, at 159; see also William F. Gaske, Note, Trade
Dress Protection: Inherent Distinctiveness as an Alternative to Secondary
Meaning, 57 FoRDHAM L. REv. 1123, 1125 (1989) (arguing that "inherent
distinctiveness is a proper test for protecting a trade dress [consisting] of
package design from infringement but not for protection of the design of a
product itself"); Melissa R. Gleiberman, Note, From Fast Cars to Fast Food:
Overbroad Protection of Product Trade Dress Under Section 43(a) of the Lanham
Act, 45 STAN. L. REV. 2037,2043 (1993) ("When the mark being protected is the
configuration of the product itself, to say that the design feature is not
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declined to hear the second question presented by the petition
for certiorari, namely "[w]hether a business may exercise a
monopoly over a 'trade dress' consisting virtually in toto of a
combination of admittedly functional features on the ground that
these features are combined in an 'arbitrary' fashion."'
Taken as a whole, therefore, federal applications of the
nonfunctionality doctrine have not satisfactorily addressed two
issues. First, why is nonfunctionality essential to protection
under the Lanham Act, particularly if, as it is most commonly
characterized, the doctrine is nothing more than a negative
implication of a congressional decision not to extend utility
patent protection to particular devices or features of those
devices? And, second, is there a rational basis for determining
the extent to which a plaintiff may protect functional features
under the theory that its design as a whole is nonfunctional?
The remaining portions of this Article argue that the Supreme
Court's decision in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone
Service Co.49 provides the key to resolving each of these
questions.
II. COPYRIGHT AND THE CONSTITUTION
A. THE "SWEAT OF THE BROW" DOCTRINE
Feist arose from a split among the Circuits over the extent
of federal copyright law protection available to so-called "low
authorship" works reflecting low levels of originality.5 ' These
works typically include compilations. 5' of information such as
descriptive of the product is simply inaccurate in the large majority of cases."
(footnote omitted)).
148. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 502 U.S. 1071, 1071 (1992).
149. 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
150. See Jane C. Ginsburg, Creation and Commercial Value: Copyright
Protection of Works of Information, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1865, 1870 (1990) ("We
have now, as we have long had, two kinds of copyright: in high authorship
works, such as novels and narrative histories, ... [and] in low authorship
works, such as telephone directories and compilations of stock quotations ... ").
151. In contrast to other types of works potentially eligible for copyright
protection, compilations presuppose preexisting elements:
When an author creates a compilation, she begins with specific and
identifiable preexisting elements. Those elements consist of three
types: 1) elements capable of copyright protection in their own right,
as in the case of a collective work; 2) elements that, for one reason or
another, are in the public domain and, consequently, are not capable
of independent copyright protection; and 3) elements that are incapable
of achieving copyright protection alone, such as raw data or facts.
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directories, databases, and mailing lists produced through
industrious gathering, rather than original creation.'52 Not-
withstanding their unexciting nature, low authorship works
historically have been the subject of considerable controversy
under federal law.5 and, in fact, "[t]he kind of works at issue
in early copyright disputes were most often highly useful, if
artistically uninspiring, works such as maps, arithmetic and
grammar primers, calendars, and law books."'54
For much of the twentieth century in particular, copyright
law and factual compilations have been uneasy bedfellows.'55
In substantial part, this tension results from the failure of the
Copyright Act of 1909156 expressly to address the extent of
protection available to the original and unoriginal elements of
compilations.'57 Indeed, the 1909 Act provided only the vague
guidance that "[tihe works for which copyright may be secured
under this title shall include all the writings of an author."5 '
This ambiguity produced two irreconcilable lines of cases that
eventually led to Feist.'59
The first line of cases embodied the so-called sweat of the
brow doctrine, which protected factual compilations on the basis
Russ VerSteeg, Rethinking Originality, 34 WM. & MARY L. REV. 801, 814 (1993)
(footnotes omitted). For the definition of "compilation" under modern federal
law, see infra note 180 and accompanying text.
152. See Jane C. Ginsburg, No "Sweat"? Copyright and Other Protection of
Works of Information After Feist v. Rural Telephone, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 338,
339 (1992) (noting that the compilation of an informational work displays "far
greater industriousness than imagination").
153. See, e.g., List Publishing Co. v. Keller, 30 F. 772, 772-73 (C.C.S.D.N.Y.
1887) (extending copyright protection to facts contained in 'society" directories);
Lawrence v. Cupples, 15 F. Cas. 25, 25-26 (C.C.D. Mass. 1875) (No. 8,135)
(extending protection to compilation of information relating to debtors and
creditors); Drury v. Ewing, 7 F. Cas. 1113, 1116 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1862) (No.
4,095) (extending protection to clothing patterns); see also EATON S. DRONE, A
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN INTELLECTUAL PRODUCTIONS IN GREAT
BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES 153 & nn.1-17 (1879) (citing early cases
extending copyright protection to various works of low authorship).
154. Ginsburg, supra note 150, at 1873.
155. Eckes v. Card Prices Update, 736 F.2d 859, 862 (2d Cir. 1984).
156. Ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1076 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 1-64 (1970
& Supp. V 1975) (repealed 1976)).
157. See Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 351
(1991) (noting that ambiguities in the 1909 Act's treatment of compilations left
'room for error").
158. 17 U.S.C. § 4 (1970).
159. See Feist, 499 U.S. at 351-53.
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of the labor expended in their collection.' 60 These cases were
grounded in nineteenth-century jurisprudence that recognized as
"a fundamental principle of the law of copyright... that a work,
to be free from piracy, must be the result of the author's 'own
labor, skill, and use of common materials and common sources
of knowledge open to all men.' "161 On one level, these cases
held that a subsequent author could not merely copy facts from
a prior work, even if those facts were later independently
verified, 162 because to do so would misappropriate the first
author's labor. 6  Taken to an extreme, however, this theory
could prevent the use of a prior work solely to confirm the
defendant's own independent research."6
The leading application of this principle under the 1909 Act,
albeit one eventually overruled in its own jurisdiction, 15 was
the Second Circuit's 1922 opinion in Jewelers' Circular Publish-
160. Amy A. Davis, Note, Caught in the Crossfire: Cable News Network v.
Video Monitoring Services and the Nature of Copyright, 53 OHIo ST. L.J. 1155,
1164 (1992).
161. DRONE, supra note 153, at 386 (quoting Emerson v. Davies, 8 F. Cas.
615, 624 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (No. 4436) (Story, J.)).
162. See, e.g., W.H. Anderson Co. v. Baldwin Law Publishing Co., 27 F.2d 82,
88 (6th Cir. 1928) (finding infringement where defendant copied plaintiffs case
annotations); Menke v. Richfield Oil Corp., 14 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 296, 298
(S.D.N.Y. 1932) (holding that an author cannot copy another's compilation, even
if the author independently verifies everything that is borrowed).
163. See, e.g., Webb v. Powers, 29 F. Cas. 511, 517 (C.C.D. Mass. 1847) (No.
17,323) (recognizing protectable copyright interest created by "toil and talent");
Emerson v. Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615, 619 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (No. 4,436) ("A man
has a right to the copy-right of a map of a state or country, which he has
surveyed or caused to be compiled from existing materials, at his own expense,
or skill, or labor, or money."); Farmer v. Elstner, 33 F. 494,496 (C.C.E.D. Mich.
1888) (extending protection to "facts which had never before been published and
which were obtained from original sources, at very considerable labor and
expense"); Kiernan v. Manhattan Quotation Tel. Co., 50 How. Pr. 194, 196-97
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1876) (recognizing "right of property in... information made by
a person who, at his own expense and by his own labor, has collected it"); Banks
v. McDivitt, 2 F. Cas. 759, 760 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1875) (No. 961) (imposing liability
for copyright infringement on ground that "the subsequent investigator ...
cannot use the labors of a previous compiler, animo furandi, and save his own
time by copying the results of the previous compiler's study, although the same
results could have been attained by independent labor").
164. See, e.g., Sampson & Murdock Co. v. Seaver-Radford Co., 140 F. 539,
542-43 (1st Cir. 1905) (enjoining defendant's publication on showing that
defendant had employed plaintiffs work in the course of verifying defendant's
data).
165. See infra notes 187-188 and accompanying text (citing Second Circuit
cases).
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ing Co. v. Keystone Publishing Co.'66 In upholding an injunc-
tion issued by then-District Judge Learned Hand,'67 the
Jewelers' Circular court held that:
The right to copyright a book upon which one has expended labor
in its preparation does not depend upon whether the materials which
he has collected consist or not of matters which are publici juris, or
whether such materials show literary skill or originality, either in
thought or in language, or anything more than industrious collection.
The man who goes through the streets of a town and puts down the
names of each of the inhabitants, with their occupations and their
street number, acquires material of which he is the author. He
produces by his labor a meritorious composition, in which he may
obtain a copyright.... ."
In contrast to the Jewelers' Circular conception of copyright,
other courts read into the 1909 Act a tacit statutory requirement
of originality based on two nineteenth-century Supreme Court
opinions.69 The first of these was The Thade-Mark Cases' 17o
constitutional holding that a work must reflect originality,
166. 281 F. 83 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 259 U.S. 581 (1922).
167. See Jewelers' Circular Publishing Co. v. Keystone Publishing Co., 274
F. 932, 936 (S.D.N.Y. 1921), affd, 281 F. 83 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 259 U.S. 581
(1922).
168. 281 F. at 88.
The Seventh Circuit's adherence to the sweat of the brow doctrine under
the 1909 Act was such that the court in Toksvig v. Bruce Publishing Co., 181
F.2d 664 (7th Cir. 1950) enjoined the defendant from using facts from the
plaintiffs work that were readily available from other sources in the public
domain:
The question is not whether [the defendant] could have obtained
the same information by going to the same sources, but rather did she
go to the same sources and do her own independent research? In other
words, the test is whether the one charged with the infringement has
made an independent production, or made a substantial and unfair use
of the complainant's work.
181 F.2d at 667. For additional case law applying the sweat of the brow doctrine
under the 1909 Act, see Leon v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 91 F.2d 484, 486-87 (9th
Cir. 1937); Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Nationwide Independent Directory
Serv., Inc., 371 F. Supp. 900, 905 (W.D. Ark. 1974); Cincinnati and Suburban
Bell Tel. Co. v. Brown, 44 F.2d 631, 632 (S.D. Ohio 1930).
169. See 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NiMMER ON COPYRIGHT
§ 2.01 n.5, at 2-6 to 2-7 (1995) (citing federal appellate decisions). In rarer
decisions, courts reached this result on their own initiative through reference
to the Constitution. See, e.g., Hartford Printing Co. v. Hartford Directory &
Publishing Co., 146 F. 332, 333 (C.C.D. Conn. 1906) (ultimately issuing relief
against copying of directory, but noting that "in so far as [the plaintiff] merely
records accurately the names of residents, with their occupations, and where to
find them at home and in business, it is impossible to discover wherein the
useful arts and sciences are promoted.")
170. 100 U.S. 82 (1879).
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namely a combination of independent creation and creativity, to
fall "under the head of writings of authors." 7' The second was
the Court's definition of "author" in Burrow-Giles Lithographic
Co. v. Sarony72 as "he to whom anything owes its origin;
originator; maker," 1' 3 and its concomitant holding that copy-
right protection was limited to the "original intellectual concep-
tions of the author." 4 Lower federal courts relying on these
precedents "inferred the [originality] requirement from the fact
that copyright protection may only be claimed by 'authors' ...
[and] reasoned that since an author is 'the ... creator,
originator' it follows that a work is not the product of an author
unless the work is original."' 5 Under these cases, therefore,
a defendant could prevail if it only made use of the facts
contained in the plaintiff's work, and then added its own creative
expression.'
7 6
Acting on the advice of the Register of Copyrights,'
171. Id. at 94.
172. 111 U.S. 53 (1884).
173. Id. at 58 (quoting WORCHESTER's DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE 99 (1897)).
174. Id.
175. 1 NIMMER & NUIMER, supra note 169, § 2.01, at 2-6 to 2-7 (footnote
omitted). Perhaps significantly, however, courts adopting this principle under
the 1909 Act frequently eviscerated it by then applying extremely low standards
for finding the required originality. See, e.g., American Code Co. v. Bensinger,
282 F. 829, 833 (2d Cir. 1922) (extending protection to code book); No-Leak-O
Piston Ring Co. v. Norris, 277 F. 951, 953 (4th Cir. 1921) (extending protection
to piston sizing guide).
176. See, e.g., Edward Thompson Co. v. American Law Book Co., 122 F. 922,
923 (2d Cir. 1903) (noting that an author may collect copyrighted works and use
selected parts to support the author's own original text); see also Collins v.
Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 106 F.2d 83, 86 (2d Cir. 1939) (finding that a
motion picture did not infringe on copyright covering book, even though similar
events occurred in both the movie and the book); Oxford Book Co. v. College
Entrance Book Co., 98 F.2d 688, 691 (2d Cir. 1938) (holding that plaintiffs could
use a copyrighted work as long as they did not copy any substantial part of the
copyrighted work); National Tel. News Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 119 F.
294,300-01 (7th Cir. 1902) (allowing the gathering of news and its transmission
by telegraph, even though the news was taken from another source); Davies v.
Bowes, 209 F. 53 (S.D.N.Y. 1913), affd, 219 F. 178 (2d Cir. 1914) (permitting
copying of a fictional short story because the author represented it as a factual
event in a newspaper story).
177. See REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHT OF THE GENERAL REvISION
OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAw 9 (1961); see also Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural




Congress limited the protection of the Copyright Act of 1976178
to "original works of authorship.' 7 Section 101 of the 1976
Act extends protection to any work "formed by the collection and
assembling of preexisting materials or of data that are selected,
coordinated, or arranged in such a way that the resulting work
as a whole constitutes an original work of authorship."80 This
language, however, is limited by section 103's admonition that
"It]he copyright in a compilation or derivative work extends only
to the material contributed by the author of such work, as
distinguished from the preexisting material employed in the
work, and does not imply any exclusive right in the preexisting
material."' 81
Based on these changes, some courts began to reject
attempts to protect industrious collections on the theory that "[a]
copyright in a [factual compilation] ... is properly viewed as
resting on the originality of the selection and arrangement of the
factual material, rather than on the industriousness of the
efforts to develop the information."8 ' In infringement actions,
therefore, "[ciopyright protection [did] not extend to the facts
themselves, and the mere use of the information contained in a
[factual compilation] without a substantial copying of the format
[did] not constitute infringement."18 Prior to Feist, the
Fifth,"M  Ninth, 85 . and Eleventh Circuits' 86  adopted this
standard, as did the Second, which, having retreated from its
178. Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§
101-1101 (1994)).
179. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1994).
180. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
181. 17 U.S.C. § 103(b).
182. Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 650 F.2d 1365, 1369 (5th Cir.
1981).
183. Id. at 1369-70; see also Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Sports Eye, Inc.,
415 F. Supp. 682, 685 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (noting that form is protectable but data
are not).
184. See Miller, 650 F.2d at 1369-70 (holding that facts themselves are
unprotectible).
185. See Worth v. Selchow & Righter Co., 827 F.2d 569, 573 (9th Cir. 1987)
(noting that use of facts is not infringement), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 977 (1988);
Cooling Sys. and Flexibles, Inc. v. Stuart Radiator, Inc., 777 F.2d 485, 491 (9th
Cir. 1985) (stating that "[clopyright law never protects the facts").
186. See Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Associated Tel. Directory
Publishers, 756 F.2d 801, 809 (11th Cir. 1985) (holding that facts are not
copyrightable).
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earlier holding in Jewelers' Circular,"' held that "[tlhere
cannot be any such thing as copyright in the order of presenta-
tion of the facts, nor, indeed, in their selection."'
Unfortunately, the 1976 Act does not expressly define
"originality." According to its drafters, "the phrase ... is
purposefully left undefined [and] is intended to incorporate
without change the standard of originality established by the
courts under the present copyright statute."'89 Prior to 1991,
this legislative history led some courts to conclude that the 1976
Act retained the sweat of the brow doctrine. 9 ° For example,
in Schroeder v. William Morrow & Co.,' 9 ' the Seventh Circuit
concluded that "only 'industrious collection,' not originality in the
sense of novelty, is required" to warrant protection. 92  Like-
187. See Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 310
(2d Cir. 1966) (repudiating the Jewelers' Circular sweat of the brow doctrine
with the observation that "[wle... cannot subscribe to the view that an author
is absolutely precluded from saving time and effort by referring to and relying
upon prior published material"), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967).
188. Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 978 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 841 (1980); see also Financial Information, Inc. v. Moody's
Investors Serv., Inc., 808 F.2d 204, 205, 207-08 (2d Cir. 1986) (declining to
extend protection to bond sale data).
189. See H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 51 (1976); see also Dale
P. Olson, Copyright Originality, 48 MO. L. REV. 29, 31 (1983) (noting the Act's
failure to define originality beyond preserving the common law's development).
190. As one commentator has noted of the relationship between the 1976 and
1909 Acts on the subject of factual compilations:
A quick look at the [1976] copyright code reveals no obvious
problems with the treatment of factual compilations. Section 102(a)
extends protection to "original works of authorship," and section 103
specifically mentions compilations as copyrightable subject matter.
The trouble begins when one discovers that Congress specifically
adopted, without change, the definition for copyrightable subject matter
established under the [1909] copyright statute.
Alfred C. Yen, The Legacy of Feist: Consequences of the Weak Connection
Between Copyright and the Economics of Public Goods, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 1343,
1349 (1991) (footnotes omitted); see also Jessica D. Litman, Copyright,
Compromise, and Legislative History, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 857, 857 (1987)
("Courts... have apparently found [the 1976 Act] an unhelpful guide. For the
most part, they look elsewhere for answers, relying primarily on prior courts'
constructions of an earlier and very different statute on the same subject [the
1909 Act].").
191. 566 F.2d 3 (7th Cir. 1977).
192. Id. at 5. For additional case law from the Seventh Circuit embracing
the sweat of the brow doctrine, see Rockford Map Publishers, Inc. v. Directory
Serv. Co., 768 F.2d 145, 148-49 (7th Cir. 1985) (extending copyright protection
to boundary lines depicted on a map), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1061 (1986); Illinois
Bell Tel. Co. v. Haines & Co., 683 F. Supp. 1204, 1207-08 (N.D. IlM. 1988)
(extending copyright protection to telephone directory listings), affd, 905 F.2d
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wise, in West Publishing Co. v. Mead Data Central, Inc.,93 the
Eighth Circuit extended protection to mere "labor and industry,"
without inquiring into the originality of the works in ques-
tion.'94 Of greatest importance, however, the sweat of the
brow doctrine led the Tenth Circuit to uphold an injunction
against the copying of a "white pages" telephone directory in
Rural Telephone Service Co. v. Feist Publications, Inc. 1
95
B. FEIST PUBLICATIONS, INC. V. RURAL TELEPHONE
SERVICE CO.
Feist resolved an issue that the Supreme Court previously
recognized as hotly disputed, namely "the ways in which
uncopyrightable elements combine with the author's original
contributions to form protected expression.""' The case
resulted from the defendant's use of the plaintiff's telephone
1081 (7th Cir. 1990).
In contrast to some decisions extending protection to industrious collection
works that "strain[ed] to find (or ... simply declare[d the existence of)
'selection and arrangement' in ... patently nonselective and 'un-arranged'
compilations," see Ginsburg, supra note 150, at 1894, at least one Seventh
Circuit trial court abandoned this approach in favor of an alternative rationale
for its holding:
Compilations such as [the defendant's] have value because the
compiler has collected data which otherwise would not be available.
The compiler's contribution to knowledge normally is the collection of
the information, not its arrangement. If his protection is limited solely
to the form of expression, the economic incentives underlying the
copyright laws are largely swept away. Recognizing this, the courts
have long afforded protection under the copyright laws against
appropriation of the fruits of the compiler's industry.
That protection does not fit nicely into the conceptual framework
of copyright law and has for that reason been criticized .... The courts
have generally rested, however, not on an analysis of copyright
concepts but on the economic incentives premise of the copyright law
and the injustice of permitting one to appropriate the fruit of another's
labor.
National Business Lists, Inc. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 552 F. Supp. 89, 92
(N.D. Ill. 1982).
193. 799 F.2d 1219 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1070 (1987).
194. Id. at 1227; see also Hutchinson Tel. Co. v. Fronteer Directory Co., 770
F.2d 128, 131-32 (8th Cir. 1985) (extending copyright protection to telephone
directory under the sweat of the brow doctrine). For a comprehensive critique
of Eighth Circuit sweat of the brow jurisprudence, see L. Ray Patterson & Craig
Joyce, Monopolizing the Law: The Scope of Copyright Protection for Law Reports
and Statutory Compilations, 36 UCLA L. REV. 719, 809-14 (1989).
195. 916 F.2d 718 (10th Cir. 1990), aft'g 663 F. Supp. 214 (D. Kan. 1987),
rev'd, 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
196. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 548
(1985).
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directory in the preparation of the defendant's own directory."'
Although the defendant attempted to verify the accuracy of the
plaintiffs information before its incorporation into the
defendant's competing directory,9 ' four of the defendant's final
entries were identical to fictitious listings planted in the
plaintiffs directory to detect copying.'99 On the basis of these
and 1304 other verbatim reproductions, the plaintiff brought a
suit for copyright infringement, and received summary judgment
on the theory that "[courts have consistently held that telephone
directories are copyrightable."2°  In an unpublished opinion,
the Tenth Circuit subsequently upheld this holding of liability as
a matter of law.2'
Granting certiorari to resolve the split in the circuits'
treatment of factual compilations,"2 the Supreme Court re-
versed. °3 The Court began by noting that the case "con-
cern[ed] the interaction of two well-established propositions.
The first is that facts are not copyrightable; the other, that
compilations of facts generally are.... There is an undeniable
tension between these two propositions.""°  In light of the
tradition of resolving this tension under the auspices of federal
copyright legislation, 5 the Court might well have been expect-
ed to turn to the 1976 Act for guidance.
The Court, however, took a far different tack. Rather than
197. Rural Telephone, 663 F. Supp. at 217.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 218.
201. Rural Tel. Serv. Co. v. Feist Publications, Inc., 916 F.2d 718 (10th Cir.
1990), rev'd, 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
202. See Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 498 U.S. 808, 808
(1990) (limiting grant of certiorari to a single issue: "[whether] the copyright in
a telephone directory ... prevent[s] access to that directory as a source of
names and numbers to compile a competing directory, or does copyright
protection extend only to the selection, coordination, or arrangement of those
names and numbers").
203. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340,364 (1991).
204. Id. at 344-45.
205. See supra notes 177-195 and accompanying text (describing copyright
legislation and subsequent case law).
206. Thus, for example, in Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation
Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539 (1985), the Court applied a statutory analysis to
conclude that "[n]o author may copyright his ideas or the facts he narrates ....
'IT]he news element-the information respecting current events contained in the
literary production-is not the creation of the writer, but is a report of matters
that ordinarily are publicijuris ....'" Id. at 556 (quoting International News
Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 234 (1918)) (citation omitted).
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determining the original contribution required for an "original
work[] of authorship" under the 1976 Act,20 7 the Court an-
nounced a framework mirroring those in The Trade-Mark Cases,
Compco, and Graham:
Originality is a constitutional requirement. The source of
Congress' power to enact copyright laws is Article I, § 8, cl. 8, of the
Constitution, which authorizes Congress to "secur[e] for limited Times
to Authors... the exclusive Right to their respective Writings."
"e originality requirement is constitutionally mandated for all
works."
20 8
The Court's constitutional analysis did not stop with
reaffirming that the Intellectual Property Clause imposes
substantive restrictions on the federal protection of intellectual
property. On the contrary, the Court went on to offer guidance
on how to apply the constitutional right to copy to works
consisting of both protectable and unprotectable elements. On
this issue, protection could not extend to unoriginal factual
material even if that material was "commingled" with original
selection and arrangement. 209 Rather, "[a] factual compilation
is eligible for copyright if it features an original selection or
arrangement of facts, but the copyright is limited to the
particular selection or arrangement. In no event may copyright
extend to the facts themselves. 10 Consequently:
This inevitably means that the copyright in a factual compilation
is thin. Notwithstanding a valid copyright, a subsequent compiler
remains free to use the facts contained in another's publication to aid
in preparing a competing work, so long as the competing work does not
feature the same selection and arrangement.
211
Applying this rule to the facts before it, the Court concluded that
the putatively original aspects of the plaintiff's arrange-
ment-the alphabetization of the directory's factual infor-
mation-fell well below the constitutional level of originality
required to warrant even "thin" copyright protection.2= In
207. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1994).
208. 499 U.S. at 346-47 (quoting Patterson & Joyce, supra note 194, at 763
n.155).
209. Id. at 349 ("No matter how original the format,... the facts themselves
do not become original through association.").
210. Id. at 350-51; see also id. at 349 ("[If the selection and arrangement are
original, these elements of the work are eligible for copyright protection."
(emphasis added)).
211. Id. at 349.
212. Id. at 363 ("[There is nothing remotely creative about arranging names
alphabetically in a white pages directory. It is an age-old practice, firmly rooted
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light of the plaintiff's inability to demonstrate that any aspect of
its work was original, the entire work was thus subject to
copying.2
13
III. ACCOMMODATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL
PRINCIPLES UNDER FEDERAL
TRADE DRESS LAW
A. THE CONSTITUTIONAL SIGNIFICANCE OF FEIST TO TRADE
DRESS LAW
Feist's constitutional holding provides the key to answering
the first critical question left unresolved by current trade dress
doctrine: against whom or what are the constitutional restric-
tions on the protection of functional designs enforceable if, as
Bonito Boats held, they are inapplicable to the states? Anticipat-
ing Feist's application of the Intellectual Property Clause to
factual compilations,214 Compco, Graham, and Bonito Boats
had each acknowledged that the provision creates a public
domain of functional product configurations.215 Nothing in the
Court's statutory preemption analyses in Sears, Goldstein, or
Kewanee conflicts with the Clause's restrictions in this area and,
indeed, the Court in both Sears and Goldstein acknowledged
their existence.216 Bonito Boats' emphasis on the constitution-
in tradition and so commonplace that it has come to be expected as a matter of
course.").
213. Id. at 363-64.
214. For an additional holding to this effect, albeit in the copyright fair use
context, see, Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 429
(1984):
The monopoly privileges that Congress may authorize [under the
Constitution] are neither unlimited nor primarily designed to provide
a special private benefit. Rather, the limited grant is a means by
which an important public purpose may be achieved. It is intended to
motivate the creative activity of authors and inventors by the provision
of a special reward, and to allow the public access to the products of
their genius after the limited period of exclusive control has expired.
Id. at 429.
215. See supra notes 76-80, 84-86, and 111-113 and accompanying text
(discussing the holdings of these cases).
216. In Sears, although holding that the interaction of pervasive federal
patent legislation and the Supremacy Clause preempted the Illinois common
law doctrine at issue, see supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text, the Court
nevertheless noted that the extension of possibly perpetual state protection to
the configuration before it would conflict with "federal constitutional standards."
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 232 (1964) (emphasis added).
The Goldstein Court's treatment of the issue was more subtle, recognizing that
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al underpinnings of the nonfunctionality doctrine, despite the
Court's retreat from the separate and independent issue of the
preemption of state unfair competition law under the Intellectual
Property Clause, is therefore no accident.217 On the contrary,
when coupled with Feist's return to the tradition of The Trade-
Mark Cases and Graham, the Court's approach demonstrates
that not only is it entirely proper to apply the Constitution to
limit or to invalidate federal intellectual property legislation,21
but the Court has every intention of doing so again in the
future.21
9
Feist therefore speaks directly to the issue of whether the
nonfimctionality requirement is nothing more than the negative
implication of the patent statutes.22 ° If the Supreme Court
had concluded in Compco and Bonito Boats only that state law
cannot prevent the copying of a functional article unprotected by
a utility patent, then protecting functional trade dress under the
Lanham Act would pose few, if any, doctrinal problems. In other
words, although Congress has chosen to preclude certain classes
of wholly functional inventions, e.g., those that lack novelty or
that are obvious, from qualifying for utility patent protec-
tion,22' it does not necessarily follow that Congress is unable
the Intellectual Property Clause imposed certain, albeit not expressly identified,
restrictions on federal authority. See Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 560
(1973).
217. See, e.g., Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thundercraft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141,
151 (1989) ("[T]hat [the] free exploitation of ideas will be the rule, to which the
protection of a [utility] patent is the exception," is "implicit in the [Intellectual
Property] Clause itself.").
218. That the Court views the various limitations contained in the
Intellectual Property Clause as applicable to all federal intellectual property
legislation and not merely the specific forms of protection presented by
individual cases is apparent in the Court's repeated citation of The Trade-Mark
Cases as support for the invalidation of the copyright law doctrine at issue in
Feist. See Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 346,
351, 362 (1991).
219. As Professor Lange has noted of Feist's likely impact in the copyright
context, "the Court has signaled its intentions to employ the Constitution to
curtail the worst inclinations in a rapidly expanding field." David Lange,
Copyright and the Constitution in the Age of Intellectual Property, 1 J. INTELL.
PROP. L. 119, 133 (1993).
220. See supra notes 121-134 and accompanying text (discussing the theory
that passage of the Lanham Act altered defendants' access to functionality
defense).
221. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1994) requires patentable subject matter to be "novel,"
in the sense that it is not already known:
[The utility patent statutes] operate in tandem to exclude from
consideration for patent protection knowledge that is already available
638
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to provide alternative avenues of relief to their owners. As both
the Fourth and Sixth Circuits have concluded in this area, the
federal government can giveth just as easily as it can taketh
away.222 Consequently, if the functionality doctrine is nothing
more than an ill-defined statutory policy created by the negative
implications of federal patent legislation,223 nothing in this
to the public. They express a congressional determination that the
creation of a monopoly in such information would not only serve no
socially useful purpose, but would in fact injure the public by removing
existing knowledge from public use.
Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 148. Likewise, "[e]ven if a particular combination of
elements is 'novel' in the literal sense... it will not qualify for federal patent
protection if its contours are so traced by the existing technology in the field
that the 'improvement is the work of the skillful mechanic, not that of the
inventor.' " Id. at 150 (quoting Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. 248, 267
(1850)); see also 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1994) (setting forth nonobviousness as a
prerequisite to patentability); Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 8-12
(1966) (describing considerations for determining nonobviousness of a patented
invention); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 229-30 (1964)
(describing the balance between promoting invention and free competition).
Perhaps significantly, and in stark contrast to its treatment of the
Intellectual Property Clause in other contexts, the Court has never held that
the novelty and nonobviousness requirements for utility patent protection are
constitutional (as opposed to statutory) requirements. See Bonito Boats, 489
U.S. at 150 ("Taken together, the novelty and nonobviousness requirements
express a congressional determination that the purposes behind the [Intellec-
tual Property] Clause are best served by free competition and exploitation of
either that which is already available to the public or that which may be readily
discerned from publicly available material.").
222. See supra notes 126-134 and accompanying text (discussing Shake-
speare Co. v. Silstar Corp. of Am., 9 F.3d 1091 (4th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114
S. Ct. 2134 (1994); Ferrari S.P.A. Esercizio Fabriche Automobili E Corse v.
Roberts, 944 F.2d 1235, 1241 (6th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 3028
(1992)).
223. See Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., 456 U.S. 844, 863 (1982) (White,
J., concurring) ("A functional characteristic is 'an important ingredient in the
commercial success of the product,' and, after [the] expiration of a patent, it is
no more the property of the originator than the product itself." (citation
omitted)); Lon Tai Shing Co. Ltd. v. Koch + Lowy, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1081,
1100 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) ("If a product is not patentable or if its patent has expired,
the policy of promoting free competition embodied in the patent laws suggests
that the product should not be entitled to protection from competitors and
certainly should not receive protection in perpetuity, which may be the effect of
the invocation of trademark law." (emphasis added)); see also Dratler, supra
note 75, at 940 n.282 ("The Bonito Boats court strongly reaffirmed the view that
the patent laws, by negative implication, create a general right to copy articles
not protected by patent or copyright."); James K Vines, Note, Consumer Meets
Computer: An Argument for Liberal Trademark Protection of Computer
Hardware Configurations Under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Trademark Act,
44 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 283, 296-97 (1987) ("According to the prevailing
rationale, granting trademark protection to functional features has the effect of
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paradigm would prevent Congress from altering this balance
through the passage of the Lanham Act or through new legisla-
tion.224
Feist, however, forecloses this result by reaffirming that the
right to copy under United States law has roots far deeper than
any statutory regime. 225 Even if perpetual protection for
functional configurations is a proper vehicle for stimulating
commerce, 26 Congress cannot override constitutional limita-
tions on its own authority merely by invoking the Commerce
Clause.227 On the contrary, it is apparent that "Congress has
plenary authority in all areas in which it has substantive
legislative jurisdiction so long as the exercise of that authority
does not offend some other constitutional restriction."22  In
deed, in the wake of Feist's linkage of the right to copy to the
Constitution itself, even critics of Feist have questioned congres-
sional authority to override the decision through legislation
granting a surrogate patent monopoly over the feature for an indefinite duration
in contravention of the patent policy of limiting the duration of functional
monopolies.").
224. Significantly, although Congress in the past has acknowledged the
temporal limits on the protection of "the useful arts" placed upon it by the
Intellectual Property Clause, see S. REP. No. 1979, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1952),
reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394, 2396, more recent legislation addressing
intellectual property issues has been based in part on the Commerce Clause, as
well as the Intellectual Property Clause. See, e.g., Generic Animal Drug and
Patent Term Restoration Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-670, 102 Stat. 3971;
Orphan Drug Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 97-414, 96 Stat. 2049. For discussions
of protecting product designs under similarly based legislation, see Oddi, supra
note 133, at 17; see also Christopher P. Bussert, Copyright Law: A Review of the
"Separability Test" and a Proposal for New Design Protection, 10 RUTGERS
COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 59, 94-101 (1983) (advocating design protection based
on European models); Steve W. Ackerman, Note, Protection of the Design of
Useful Articles: Current Inadequacies and Proposed Solutions, 11 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 1043, 1068-71 (1983) (proposing design protection bill).
225. See also Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 151 (noting that it is "implicit in the
[Intellectual Property] Clause itself[] that free exploitation of ideas will be the
rule, to which the protection of a federal patent is the exception" (emphasis
added)).
226. See Edward S. Irons & Mary H. Sears, The Constitutional Standard of
Invention-The Touchstone for Patent Reform, 1973 UTAH L. REV. 653, 675-76
("[A] separate patent clause was included at least in part to emphasize that
Congress had no power to provide for the granting of patents primarily as a
stimulant to commerce.").
227. See United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1628 (1995) ("[E]ven...
modem-era precedents which have expanded congressional power under the
Commerce Clause confirm that this power is subject to outer limits.").
228. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 941 (1983) (citation omitted) (emphasis
added) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 132 (1976) (per curiam)).
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promulgated under the Commerce Clause.229 Although Con-
gress may indeed create "other federal statutory protection"
outside the restrictions of the Intellectual Property Clause,23°
efforts to evade the Clause's limits are valid only if they create
qualitatively different protection."'
In restricting recovery for infringement to cases in which a
plaintiff (1) uses in commerce 2 (2) a nonfunctional trade dress
and can prove (3) that the trade dress is a distinctive indicator
of origin 233 and (4) that the defendant has employed a confus-
ingly similar trade dress,1 4 federal trade dress law obviously
differs in significant respects from its utility patent counter-
party Nevertheless, however desirable the other prerequi-
sites may be to prevent a statutory conflict with federal utility
patent legislation, only the second-nonfunctionality-has a
textual basis in the Constitution and none of the Court's
229. See, e.g., Ginsburg, supra note 152, at 370 ("Assuming that the more
specific clause does limit the more general one, Congress does not have power
to override Patent-Copyright Clause limitations by creating under the
Commerce Clause a form of protection of compiled information coextensive with
copyright protection."); Yen, supra note 190, at 1377 (noting that congressional
attempts to overrule Feist on the merits could "precipitate a constitutional crisis
over the scope of copyright"); Jennifer R. Dowd, Note, A Selective View of
History: Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 34 B.C. L. REV.
137, 158 (1992) ("In light of the Feist Court's insistence upon the constitutional
origin of the originality standard, however, such an amendment would not be
constitutional."); cf L. Ray Patterson, Copyright Overextended: A Preliminary
Inquiry Into the Need for a Federal Statute of Unfair Competition, 17 U. DAYTON
L. REV. 385, 410 (1992) (suggesting that congressional efforts to overrule Feist
under the Commerce Clause would violate the First Amendment).
230. See Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234,238 (1964);
see also Ferrari S.P.A. Esercizio Fabriche Automobili E Corse v. Roberts, 944
F.2d 1235, 1241 (6th Cir. 1991) (concluding that Lanham Act creates protection
independent of that authorized by Intellectual Property Clause), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 3028 (1992).
231. Ginsburg, supra note 152, at 370-71.
232. See Haymaker Sports, Inc. v. Turian, 581 F.2d 257,261 (C.C.P-. 1978)
("The owner of a trade-mark may not, like the proprietor of a patented
invention, make a negative and merely prohibitive use of it as a monopoly.").
233. See supra notes 19, 23 and accompanying text (describing the source
identification function of trademarks).
234. See supra note 22 and accompanying text (describing the "likelihood of
confusion" test for trademark infringement liability).
235. As one court has explained, albeit in the design patent context, 'fthe
trademark owner has an indefinite term of protection, it is true, but in an
infringement suit must also prove secondary meaning and likelihood of
confusion, which the owner of a design patent need not do; there is therefore no
necessary inconsistency between the two modes of protection." W.T. Rogers Co.
v. Keene, 778 F.2d 334, 337 n.8 (7th Cir. 1985).
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decisions has suggested that satisfaction of the other factors will
obviate this requirement." 6 As long as it does not reach utili-
tarian features, the Lanham Act is consistent with the Intellec-
tual Property Clause. The Act's extension to functional elements
at the behest of trade dress owners," however, would create
a regime of protection directly overlapping that contemplated by
the Clause, independent of any other requirements that may be
imposed on plaintiffs.3 '
Thus, in light of the holding in Compco and its progeny that
the protection of functional designs is subject to constitutionally
manidated temporal limitations, prohibiting the copying of these
designs under the Act would create more than a conflict with
statutory patent law. Rather, as one court has noted in
determining the eligibility of the plaintiff's product configuration
for federal trade dress protection, "[a] prohibition against
copying under such circumstances would contravene the policy
236. Indeed,'it is apparent that in cases involving functional designs, issues
of distinctiveness and confusing similarity become moot. See, e.g., Sno-Wizard
Mfg., Inc. v. Eisemann Prods. Co., 791 F.2d 423, 427 n.4 (5th Cir. 1986) ("[A]
design cannot be found both legally functional-that is, not entitled to
trademark protection-and 'sufficiently distinctive' to serve as an indicator of
source."); TMEP, supra note 57, § 1202.03(a)(i)(C), at 1202-5 ("A showing of
acquired distinctiveness is irrelevant with regard to a design that is de jure
functional.").
237. See David Lange, Recognizing the Public Domain, 44 LAw & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Autumn 1981, at 147, 168 ("[P]roprieters of trademarks and related
impedimenta are subject to natural pressures to expand the boundaries of their
interests, even at the risk of appearing silly or rapacious and not infrequently
at the cost of expropriatory excursions into the public domain.").
238. For an express judicial recognition of the constitutional conflict created
by a disregard of the nonfunctionality requirement for trade dress protection,
see Kohler Co. v. Moen Inc., 12 F.3d 632 (7th Cir. 1993). In Kohler, the Seventh
Circuit upheld the registrability of an admittedly nonfunctional trade dress
against the appellant's claims that registration under the Lanham Act would
impermissibly conflict with the Intellectual Property Clause. This result,
however, was conditioned upon the premise that" 'provided that a defense of
functionality is recognized, there is no conflict with federal patent law .... ' "
Id. at 638 (quoting W.T. Rogers Co. v. Keene, 778 F.2d 334,337 (7th Cir. 1985)).
As the court additionally acknowledged in reaching its holding, "Congress could
conceivably enact legislation conferring perpetual patent-like monopolies that
would conflict with the patent clause's requirement that exclusive rights to
authors and inventors be only 'for limited Times.' " Id. at 642-43; see also
Tempo Communications, Inc. v. Columbian Art Works, Inc., 223 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
721, 722 (N.D. Ill. 1983) ("Just as state laws conferring perpetual monopolies
could undermine the constitutional language of securing exclusive rights to
authors and inventors 'for limited Times,' Art. I, § 8, so Congress, conceivably,
could circumvent that language by granting perpetual patents and copyrights
under the guise of some other form of trade regulation.").
1996] TRADE DRESS PROTECTION 643
... of the Constitution which gives the public free access to those
materials in the public domain."" 9 Because the Lanham Act
can no more abrogate constitutional mandates than can other
federal legislation,' 0 its potentially perpetual protection does
not reach individually functional elementsW'-not only because
the Act does not expressly address them, but because it cannot
do so.
2 42
239. R.M. Smith, Inc. v. Collins Ltd., 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 465,468 (W.D. Pa.
1983) (emphasis added); see also Versa Prods. Co. v. Bifold Co., 50 F.3d 189, 204
(3d Cir. 1995) (noting in context of federal trade dress infringement action that
"[the federal policy, found in Art. I, § 8, cl. 8, of the Constitution and in the
implementing federal statutes, of allowing free access to copy whatever the
federal patent and copyright laws leave in the public domain is an ever-present
consideration").
240. See Tempo Communications, 223 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 722 ("It is true that
some concerns expressed in Sears and Compco are valid also with respect to
federal legislation."). For representative cases holding findings of liability under
the Lanham Act subject to constitutional limitations, see Cliffs Notes, Inc. v.
Bantam Doubleday Dell Publishing Group, Inc., 886 F.2d 490, 493-97 (2d Cir.
1989) (holding trademark "parody" subject to heightened First Amendment
standard of liability); Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 997-1002 (2d Cir. 1989)
(holding movie title protected by First Amendment against liability under
Lanham Act); Ocean Bio-Chem, Inc. v. Turner Network Television, Inc., 741 F.
Supp. 1546, 1552-53, 1553 n.2 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (applying heightened First
Amendment standard for liability).
241. See Sno-Wizard Mfg., Inc. v. Eisemann Prods. Co., 791 F.2d 423,425 n.2
(5th Cir. 1986) (concluding, in federal trade dress infringement action brought
under Lanham Act, that "[s]tated simply, 'functionality' privileges the copying
of... features that are functional" (quoting Sicilia Di R. Biebow & Co. v. Cox,
732 F.2d 417, 422 (5th Cir. 1984)).
242. On this issue, Bonito Boats' observations on the degree of permissible
congressional action under the Intellectual Property Clause are clear and
unambiguous:
[Tihe Clause contains both a grant of power and certain limitations
upon the exercise of that power. Congress may not create patent
monopolies of unlimited duration, nor may it "authorize the issuance
of patents whose effects are to remove existent knowledge from the
public domain, or to restrict free access to materials already available."
Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146 (1989)
(quoting Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966)). As one commentator
has noted of similar statements elsewhere in the opinion:
The Lanham Act end around used by some courts clearly flies in
the face of the Bonito Boats reaffirmation of the reasoning of Sears-
Compco. If a prohibition on the copying and selling of an article
substantially conflicts with "the strong federal policy favoring free
competition in ideas which do not merit patent protection," then that
conflict is present whether the prohibition derives from state common
law or from the decisional creativity of some of the lower federal courts
interpreting the Lanham Act. If prohibiting the copying of an article
"substantially impedes the public use of the otherwise unprotected
design and utilitarian ideas" embodied in the article, then that
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Recognition of the constitutional dimensions of the
nonfunctionality requirement would resolve the second unan-
swered question of trade dress law, namely the extent to which
competitors may protect designs that consist entirely of func-
tional elements.2" On this issue, the Lanham Act's treatment
of trade dress differs from copyright law's treatment of factual
compilations in that it does not contain a framework to protect
the copying of unprotectable elements.2" Thus, although the
Feist Court rested its holding on the Intellectual Property
Clause, such a broad analysis was unnecessary and, indeed,
arguably undesirable. 5 Rather, the Court might well have
substantial impediment is present whether it happens to have been
produced by a state court or a [federal] circuit court.
Hilmy, supra note 127, at 756 (footnotes omitted); cf. Dratler, supra note 75, at
923 ("[Al1 doubt concerning trademark protection for industrial designs does
not, like an evil spirit, disappear upon incantation of the words 'Lanham Act.'
243. See supra notes 135-148 and accompanying text (discussing the extent
of protection for functional and nonfunctional design features under prevailing
law).
244. Likewise, the Lanham Act contains no express provision corresponding
to the 1976 Copyright Act's treatment of works consisting of both functional and
nonfunctional elements:
[Tihe design of a useful article... shall be considered a pictorial,
graphic, or sculptural work only if, and only to the extent that, such
design incorporates pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features that can
be identified separately from, and are capable of existing independently
of, the utilitarian aspects of the article.
17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994). As the legislative history notes of this language:
[A]lthough the shape of an industrial product may be aesthetically
satisfying and valuable, the Committee's intention is not to offer it
copyright protection under the bill. Unless the shape of an automobile,
airplane, ladies' dress, food processor, television set, or any other
industrial product contains some element that, physically or concep-
tually, can be identified as separable from the utilitarian aspects of
that article, the design would not be copyrighted under the bill.
H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 55 (1976). For applications of this
standard, compare Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989,
993 (2d Cir. 1980) (upholding copyright protection for belt buckles on ground
that "[tihe primary ornamental aspect of the ... buckles is conceptually
separable from their subsidiary utilitarian function") with Carol Barnhart Inc.
v. Economy Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411, 419 (2d Cir. 1985) (declining to extend
copyright protection to partial human mannequins on ground that "the features
claimed to be aesthetic or artistic ... are inextricably intertwined with the
utilitarian feature, the display of clothes"). On conceptual separability in the
copyright context, see generally Bussert, supra note 224.
245. As Professor Ginsburg has noted, "it is ironic that the Feist opinion's
author, while announcing an unsought constitutional resolution [in Feist],
elsewhere ... [has] admonished the Court for unnecessary decisions of
constitutional issues." Ginsburg, supra note 152, at 382 (citing Webster v.
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simply relied upon the express text of the 1976 Copyright
Act: 6 "Having found that the statute barred [the] plaintiffs
claim, the Court had no further need to declare a constitutional
basis for the result, much less announce that basis 'no fewer
than thirteen times.' "17
In light of this preexisting legislative accommodation under
the 1976 Copyright Act, it is hardly surprising that post-Feist
copyright cases have begun to give the Intellectual Property
Clause the respect it is due."5 In contrast, however, courts
applying the constitutional mandate of Compco and Bonito Boats
in the trade dress context have not had the benefit of similar
express legislative guidance. 9 Thus, even federal jurists
Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 526 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring
in part and concurring in the judgment)); see also supra note 79 (noting that the
Court will attempt to construe a statute to avoid the danger of unconstitution-
ality).
246. For a comprehensive critique of the sweat of the brow doctrine from a
statutory, as well as a constitutional, perspective, see Patterson & Joyce, supra
note 194; see also Dowd, supra note 229, at 156 ("The United States Supreme
Court could have reached the conclusion that the directory in Feist was not
protected without invoking the Constitution.").
247. Ginsburg, supra note 152, at 382 n.206 (quoting Paul Goldstein,
Copyright, 38 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 109, 119 (1991)); see also Paul J. Heald, The
Vices of Originality, 1991 SuP. CT. REv. 143, 144 (criticizing Feist for "blud-
geonting] the [constitutional] point home").
248. See, e.g., BellSouth Advertising and Publishing Corp. v. Donnelley Info.
Publishing, 999 F.2d 1436, 1442-43 (11th Cir. 1993) (en banc) (applying Feist
to hold yellow pages directories insufficiently original to warrant protection),
cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 943 (1994); Kregos v. Associated Press, 937 F.2d 700,
703 (2d Cir. 1991) (declining to protect statistical compilation of horse racing
information); Sem-Torq, Inc. v. K Mart Corp., 936 F.2d 851, 855 (6th Cir. 1991)
(declining to protect packaged set of "for sale" signs as compilation); Illinois Bell
Tel. Co. v. Haines & Co., 932 F.2d 610, 611 (7th Cir. 1991) (refusing protection
to white pages telephone directory); Mid America Title Co. v. Kirk, 867 F. Supp.
673, 685 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (dismissing attempts to protect real property title
research); Sinai v. Bureau of Automotive Repair, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1809,
1811 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (entering summary judgment in defendant's favor in suit
to protect automobile emission manual); CMAX/Cleveland, Inc. v. UCR, Inc., 804
F. Supp. 337, 352 (M.D. Ga. 1992) (declining to extend protection for computer
software retrieving information incident to the "rent-to-own" furniture industry);
Project Dev. Group, Inc. v. O.H. Materials Corp., 766 F. Supp. 1348, 1354 (W.D.
Pa. 1991) (applying Feist to find insufficient originality in subcontractor's bid
proposal), affd, 993 F.2d 225 (3d Cir. 1993). For surveys of federal courts'
applications of Feist, see 1 WILLIAM F. PATRY, COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE
199-200 (1994); Tracy Lea Meade, Note, Ex-Post Feist: Applications of a
Landmark Copyright Decision, 2 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 245 (1994).
249. See In re Deister Concentrator Co., 289 F.2d 496, 501 (C.C.P.A- 1961);
see also Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2753, 2760 (1992)
(noting that 15 U.S.C § 1125(a), which creates the most commonly invoked
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recognizing that the Clause mandates a public domain in the
trade dress context, as well as under patent and copyright law,
have conceded that "[tihe doctrine of functionality is an extra-
statutory doctrine, neither defined nor limited by the express
provisions of the Lanham Trademark Act. ... "250
Nor have the lower federal courts had the benefit of clear
interstitial lawmaking from the Supreme Court. In perhaps its
clearest opportunity to define "functionality" under the Lanham
Act, Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc.,251 the
Court limited its holding to the proper scope of appellate review
under the "clearly erroneous" standard.252 Likewise, as noted
above, 253 the Court in Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc. 254
went out of its way to avoid the issue of whether purely func-
tional elements can be arranged to create a protectable trade
dressy.2 5  For better or for worse, therefore, the Court's failure
to address this issue leaves trade dress law without the clear
statement afforded to copyright law by Feist.
25 6
cause of action against trade dress infringement, "does not mention trademarks
or trade dress"); Dratler, supra note 75, at 942 n.289 ("[T]he issue of function-
ality ... was not considered in the legislative process, which focused on other
issues, and functionality doctrine in general has never been codified.").
250. Shakespeare Co. v. Silstar Corp. of Am., 9 F.3d 1091, 1099 (4th Cir.
1993) (Niemeyer, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2134 (1994).
251. 456 U.S. 844 (1982).
252. See id. at 855-59. In Inwood Laboratories, the district court had found,
as a factual matter, that the nonfunctionality requirement protected the
defendants' copying of the putative trade dress of the plaintiffs drug tablets.
See Ives Labs. v. Darby Drug Co., 488 F. Supp. 394, 397 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), rev'd,
638 F.2d 538 (2d Cir. 1981), rev'd and remanded sub nom. Inwood Labs. v. Ives
Labs., 456 U.S. 844 (1982). On appeal, however, the Second Circuit reversed
the district court's holding in the defendants' favor, without addressing whether
the result of the district court's functionality analysis was clearly erroneous.
See 456 U.S. at 857 n.20. Although concluding that the district court's finding
"[was] not, as a matter of law, unreasonable," id. at 856 n.16, the Court offered
little guidance as to what standard governed this holding, noting only that "[in
general terms, a product feature is fimctional if it is essential to the use or
purpose of the article or if it affects the cost or quality of the article." Id. at 851
n.10; see Brunswick Corp. v. Spinit Reel Co., 832 F.2d 513, 517 (8th Cir. 1987)
("In the Inwood Laboratories case, the Supreme Court stated the standard for
determining functionality only 'in general terms,' and that in dictum.").
253. See supra notes 145-148 and accompanying text (describing the Court's
holding in Two Pesos).
254. 112 S. Ct. 2753 (1992).
255. See id. at 2757 n.6.
256. See Vincent N. Palladino, Trade Dress After Two Pesos, 84 TRADEMARK
REP. 408, 417 (1994) (noting that Two Pesos "may have raised more questions
than it answered").
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B. THE LIMITS OF "THIN" TRADE DRESS PROTECTION
In the absence of express guidance from either the Supreme
Court or Congress on the extent of protection properly afforded
to trade dress consisting of both functional and nonfunctional
elements, federal courts have been largely unreceptive to a
doctrinal framework reflecting the trade dress equivalent of
Feist, namely that "functional features which are not the subject
of a valid [utility] patent or copyright may be imitated with
impunity."257 Such a rule clearly is reflected in Textron, Inc.
v. United States International Trade Commission,25 in which
the manufacturer of a milling device unsuccessfully sought
exclusion of a competing machine under section 337 of the Tariff
Act of 1930.259 Although the manufacturer successfully con-
vinced the International Trade Commission that the overall
configuration of its device constituted a nonfunctional trade
dress, the Federal Circuit reversed this holding because only one
of the device's components "has been or can be designed in an
alternative manner and work as well, at an equivalent cost."26 '
Concluding that no nonfunctional features were duplicated by
the competitor's device, the court held exclusion to be inappropri-
ate on the ground that "where most of the product's overall
design is functional, the nonfunctional components alone, rather
than the overall design, are capable of being considered a
257. Fisher Stoves, Inc. v. All Nighter Stove Works, Inc., 626 F.2d 193, 195
(1st Cir. 1980); accord Sunbeam Corp. v. Equity Indus. Corp., 635 F. Supp. 625,
635 (E.D. Va. 1986), aff/d, 811 F.2d 1505 (4th Cir. 1987); see also AmBrit, Inc.
v. Kraft, Inc., 812 F.2d 1531, 1538 (11th Cir. 1986) (extending protection to
certain elements of plaintiffs trade dress, but holding that, with respect to the
functional elements, "[the defendant] was ... free to imitate those features of
the [plaintiffs] packaging with complete impunity"), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041
(1987).
258. 753 F.2d 1019 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
259. 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1994). As summarized by the Federal Circuit:
Section 337, in relevant part, declares unlawful: "Unfair methods
of competition and unfair acts in the importation of articles ... the
effect or tendency of which is to destroy or substantially injure an
industry ... in the United States." Thus, to prove a violation of
section 337, the complainant must show both an unfair act and a
resulting detrimental effect or tendency.
New England Butt Co. v. International Trade Comm'n, 756 F.2d 874, 876 (Fed.
Cir. 1985). Actions under section 337 are initially heard by the International
Trade Commission, whose factual holdings are then subject to review by the
Federal Circuit under a substantial evidence test. Id.
260. 753 F.2d at 1026 (footnote omitted).
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trademark."261
This treatment of trade dress consisting in part of functional
elements is equally apparent in American Greetings Corp. v:
Dan-Dee Imports, Inc.,262 in which the plaintiffs sought to
preclude the defendant's use of "tummy graphics" on toy
bears. 23 Although the district court concluded that the graph-
ics themselves were functional, in that they were "the best
possible way" of communicating the personalities associated with
the bears,2u it nevertheless barred the defendant from produc-
ing or selling products "embody[ing] a combination of elements
[including the tummy graphics] such that their overall appear-
ance is likely to cause confusion with the overall appearance of
plaintiffs' [product]."265 On appeal, however, the Third Circuit
reversed this aspect of the injunction because it prohibited the
defendant's use of individually functional elements.266 Antici-
pating Feist's holding in the copyright context, the appellate
court concluded that "a court may not enter an injunction the
practical effect of which is to preclude the defendant from using
the functional features of the plaintiffs' combination. This
proposition is a necessary corollary of the functionality doc-
trine.2 67
261. Id. at 1027 (emphasis added); see also Petersen Mfg. Co. v. Central
Purchasing, Inc., 740 F.2d 1541, 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1984) ("To assert an overall
product shape as a mark, the entire design must be arbitrary or non de jure
functional.").
262. 807 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir. 1986).
263. As described by the court, these features were "pictorial designs on...
white stomachs." Id. at 1138.
264. American Greetings Corp. v. Dan-Dee Imports, Inc., 619 F. Supp. 1204,
1219 (D.N.J. 1985), affd in part and rev'd inpart, 807 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir. 1986).
265. Id. at 1221.
266. See 807 F.2d at 1144-45.
267. Id. at 1144 (emphasis added). Applying this rule to the facts before it,
the Third Circuit concluded that:
Because teddy bears are in the public domain, it necessarily
follows.., that the duty of [the defendant] to distinguish its products
where feasible to do so does not extend to abandoning the standard
configuration of a teddy bear. In short, [the defendant] appears to be
entitled to market teddy bears just as it is entitled to utilize tummy
graphics on plush toys. It should not be enjoined from using both
together absent a finding that it is feasible, by altering other features
of a teddy bear, to avoid a likelihood of confusion ....
Id. at 1145.
For a dissenting opinion applying a similar analysis, see Ferrari S.P_.
Esercizio Fabriche Automobili E Corse v. Roberts, 944 F.2d 1235 (6th Cir. 1991),
cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 3028 (1992):
[Tihe majority opinion does more than protect consumers against
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Even upon the most cursory of examinations, these decisions
reflect a "thin" conception of trade dresses composed of individu-
ally functional features that is equivalent to the "thin" copyright
covering factual compilations such as that at issue in Feist. Just
as the owner of a copyright covering a compilation of facts
cannot preclude the copying of those facts by adding in scattered
"false" ones,"' so too is it inappropriate for courts to extend
protection to the entirety of a putative trade dress that encom-
passes functional, as well as nonfunctional, components. 9 As
both the Federal and Ninth Circuits have concluded, "the right
to copy better working designs would, in due course, be stripped
of all meaning if overall functional designs were accorded
trademark protection because they included a few arbitrary and
nonfunctional features." '
Despite the absence of express guidance from the Supreme
Court, therefore, courts can and should recognize that, just as
the Constitution restricts the ability of copyright owners to
protect public domain elements of their works, it concomitantly
a likelihood of confusion as to the source of the goods; it protects the
source of the goods, [the plaintiff], against [the defendants] copying of
its design even if the replication is accompanied by adequate labelling
so as to prevent consumer confusion.... The product of these errors
is a remedy that provides [the plaintiff] with absolute protection in
perpetuity against copying [of] its unpatented design.
Id. at 1248 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
268. See Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340,344-50
(1991).
269. See Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 863 (1982)
(White, J., concurring) ("Reproduction of a functional attribute is legitimate
competitive activity."). As the court noted in Badger Meter, Inc. v. Grinnell
Corp., 13 F.3d 1145 (7th Cir. 1994):
While protectible trade dress can include the combination of
otherwise non-protectible functional elements, . . . this Court is loath
to protect the clearly functional aspects of a product in the manner
suggested here by plaintiff. The proper method of protecting the
internal parts of the plaintiffs measuring chamber is by patent; if such
protection is unavailable, or if plaintiff did not avail itself of such
protection, it should not seek to deprive consumers of the benefits of
competition by means of overbroad characterizations of its "trade
dress."
Id. at 1154 (citations omitted).
270. Textron Inc. v. United States Intl Trade Comm'n, 753 F.2d 1019, 1025
(Fed. Cir. 1985); accord Clamp Mfg. Co. v. Enco Mfg. Co., 870 F.2d 512, 516 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 872 (1989); see also Petersen Mfg. Co. v. Central
Purchasing, Inc., 740 F.2d 1541, 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1984) ("An overall design is not
removed from the category of a non-protectable shape (i.e., de jure functional)
merely because it includes some arbitrary features.").
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restricts the ability of trade dress owners to do the same.27' If
as the Feist Court concluded in its constitutional analysis,
"c]ommon sense tells us that 100 uncopyrightable facts do not
magically change their status when gathered together in one
place,"272 the same principles apply with equal force in the
trade dress context .27  Simply put, elements that are individu-
ally unprotectable in and of themselves do not magically acquire
trade dress status through mere association with each other and
in the absence of a separate and independent nonfunctional
gloss.274
Significantly, however, because "particular features may
become an indication of source even though the entire product
shape does not meet the [nonfunctionality] criteri[on],"275
recognition of a thin conception of trade dress would not
preclude plaintiffs from protecting individually nonfunctional
features or the nonfunctional gloss covering arrangements of
functional features.276 Thus, for example, the Second Circuit
in Le Sportsac, Inc. v. K Mart Corp.2 77 rejected the contention
271. Cf RESTATEMENT, supra note 21, § 21 cmt. c, at 230 ("Similarities that
are attributable to the use of only unprotected elements will not support a
finding of infringement.").
272. Feist, 499 U.S. at 345; see also id. at 349 ("No matter how original the
format... the facts themselves do not become original through association.").
273. See Elmer v. ICC Fabricating, Inc., 67 F.3d 1571, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
(finding no liability for trade dress infringement as a matter of law on the
ground that plaintiff "did not show at trial, nor does it now explain, how
combining the [functional] elements of its asserted trade dress renders the trade
dress as a whole primarily nonfunctional"); see also Jerre B. Swann, The Design
of Restaurant Interiors-A New Approach to Aesthetic Functionality, 76
TRADEMARK REP. 408, 410 (1986) ("[Amny implicit suggestion that patently
functional features may achieve some modicum of insulation by the admixing
of other features is suspect.").
274. See, e.g., Textron, 753 F.2d at 1025 ("In cases where the holders of
[composite functional and nonfumctional] designs seek trademark protection, it
can be obtained only for those features that are nonfunctional."); Vuitton et Fils
S-A. v. J. Young Enters., Inc., 644 F.2d 769, 774 (9th Cir. 1981) (same);
Leisurecraft Prods. Ltd. v. International Dictating Equip. Inc., 210 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 193, 194 (D.D.C. 1981) (requiring plaintiff to demonstrate that
protectable elements of its design were "distinctive and arbitrary enough to
separate [themselves] from the function of the product").
275. Petersen Mfg. Co. v. Central Purchasing, Inc., 740 F.2d 1541, 1550 (Fed.
Cir. 1984).
276. See, e.g., John H. Harland Co. v. Clarke Checks, Inc., 711 F.2d 966,983-
84 (11th Cir. 1983) (upholding plaintiffs jury verdict on ground that, although
certain copied features were functional, sufficient evidence supported finding
that nonfunctional elements had been copied as well).
277. 754 F.2d 71 (2d Cir. 1985).
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that the district court's injunction impermissibly prevented the
defendant from using individually functional features, noting
that "[the plaintiff] claims as its mark the particular combination
and arrangement of design elements .. ,27' Likewise, in
Vaughan Manufacturing Co. v. Brikam International, Inc.,2'
the Seventh Circuit upheld a preliminary injunction prohibiting
the copying of the plaintiff's folding table against a challenge
grounded in the functionality of the table's constituent elements:
The district court in this case carefully limited the protectible
trade dress to features of the table that were not essential to the
overall function of the table: the yellow color of the table sides; the
color of the masonite top; the black color of the frame; and the style,
shape, and color of the lock, handle, label, and other brass parts. At
the hearing, [the plaintiff] brought forward evidence that other folding
picnic table manufacturers had products that varied significantly from
[the plaintiff's] table with respect t. these features.280
These decisions recognize the converse of Feist, namely that
liability may attach once a defendant's appropriation has moved
beyond the scope of the right to copy created by the Intellectual
Property Clause, even if an otherwise functional product
configuration is concerned.28' Because, according to its text
and under The Trade-Mark Cases' application of that text, the
Clause's "for limited Times" language is directly applicable to
278. Id. at 76 (emphasis added); see also Taco Cabana Intl Inc. v. Two Pesos,
Inc., 932 F.2d 1113, 1119 (5th Cir. 1991) ("[A] particular arbitrary combination
of functional features, the combination of which is not itself fimctional, properly
enjoys protection."), affd, 112 S. Ct. 2753 (1992).
279. 814 F.2d 346 (7th Cir. 1987).
280. Id. at 350 (emphasis added). For another holding to similar effect in
the furniture trade dress context, see Devan Designs, Inc. v. Palliser Furniture
Corp., 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1991 (M.D.N.C. 1992), affd without op., 998 F.2d
1008 (4th Cir. 1993), in which the plaintiff successfully defeated the defendant's
claims of functionality (although it ultimately failed to demonstrate that its
trade dress was a distinctive indicator of origin):
In this case, both the parties agree that the material dictates
eighty percent of the design options for furniture of this type. The
twenty percent of the options remaining, however, still constitute a
significant number. While furniture itself has a functional purpose,
the shape of a drawer or the color of a case good's front, are not
dictated by utilitarian characteristics. A furniture manufacturer has
room, even within Ea particular] medium, to craft a design without all
the elements of the Plaintiffs design.
Id. at 2002.
281. The test for protectable trade dress proposed by this Article thus is
consistent with the conclusion of the Seventh Circuit in Kohler Co. v. Moen Inc.,
12 F.3d 632 (7th Cir. 1993), that product configurations are not inherently
incapable of protection under a trade dress theory. Id. at 636-43.
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"invention and discovery,"2 2 this restriction is inapplicable to
nonfunctional elements that do not result from "sudden in-
vention," "genius," or "laborious thought."28 Thus, although
there may be "absolutely nothing legally or morally reprehensi-
ble about exact copying of things in the public domain,"2 4 full
recognition of the Clause in the trade dress context would not
mean "that the copying of a functional feature ... protects a
defendant who has also reproduced nonfunctional features."285
Nor would it preclude liability if a defendant's copying of entirely
functional features is coupled with separate and independent
acts of unfair competition such as "palming off," false advertis-
ing, or deceptive trade practices. 6  On the contrary, relief
under these circumstances is not only permissible, but appropri-
ate.287
CONCLUSION
Americans take their constitutional freedoms seriously,
282. See United States v. Steffens (The Trade-Mark Cases), 100 U.S. 82, 93
(1879); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (authorizing Congress "[t]o promote
the Progress of Science... by securing for limited Times to ... Inventors the
exclusive Right to their... Discoveries").
283. The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. at 94.
284. See Brooks Shoe Mfg. Co. v. Suave Shoe Corp., 716 F.2d 854, 860 (11th
Cir. 1983) (quoting 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITON § 15:4, at 531 (2d ed. 1982)).
285. Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 864 n.6 (1982)
(White, J., concurring).
286. In cases in which such egregious facts exist, a finding of a protectable
designation of origin is not a prerequisite for relief: 'The simplest form of
[unfair competition] is to use the [trade dress] of another, but the law goes
further than that.'" B.H. Bunn Co. v. AAA Replacement Parts Co., 451 F.2d
1254, 1259 (5th Cir. 1971) (quoting American-Marietta Co. v. Krigsman, 275
F.2d 287, 289 (2d Cir. 1960)). Consequently, the alleged use of an unprotectable
device will not excuse intentional consumer deception. See, e.g., Singer Mfg. Co.
v. Bent, 163 U.S. 205 (1896) (upholding liability for deceptive use of
unprotectable generic word mark); see also Murphy Door Bed Co. v. Interior
Sleep Sys., Inc., 874 F.2d 95, 102 (2d Cir. 1989) (defining unfair competition to
include use of a generic mark to confuse the public into mistakenly purchasing
a product in the belief that the product is that of a competitor); Blinded
Veterans Ass'n v. Blinded Am. Veterans Found., 872 F.2d 1035, 1045-46 (D.C.
Cir. 1989) (same); Metric & Multistandard Components Corp. v. Metric's, Inc.,
635 F.2d 710, 714 (8th Cir. 1980) (same).
287. See American Greetings Corp. v. Dan-Dee Imports, Inc., 807 F.2d 1136,
1143 (3d Cir. 1986) ("[V]irtually every product is a combination of functional
and non-functional features and a rule denying protection to any combination
of features including a functional one would emasculate the law of trade dress
infringement.").
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perhaps as seriously as do their law professors. Neverthe-
less, the right to copy has not been historically regarded as one
of the nobler freedoms in the constitutional pantheon and,
indeed, in many contexts copying may constitute a de facto
"capital offense"2 89 subjecting the offender to overwhelming
opprobrium and possible liability. Consequently, "[wihen
appropriated [materials] are used to construct a work that is
virtually identical to the original, courts can be expected to find
infringement without regard to the theoretical limitations of doc-
trine."29°
As this Article has demonstrated, however, the constitu-
tional foundation of these doctrinal limitations renders courts'
persistent disregard of them in the trade dress context particu-
larly inappropriate.29' If the Supreme Court's decision to link
the outcome in Feist to a constitutional right to copy in fact
"signal[s] its intention to begin the serious business of bringing
288. See, e.g., RONALD DwORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977); TAKING
THE CONSTITUTION SERIOUSLY: ESSAYS ON THE CONSTITUTION AND CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW (G.L. McDowell ed., 1981); Susan Blandes, Taking Some Rights Too
Seriously: The State's Right to a Fair Trial, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 1019 (1987);
Emma C. Jordan, Taking Voting Rights Seriously: Rediscovering the Fifteenth
Amendment, 64 NEB. L. REv. 389 (1985); Robin West, Foreward: Taking
Freedom Seriously, 104 HARV. L. REV. 43 (1990).
289. Laurie Stearns, Comment, Copy Wrong: Plagiarism, Process, Property,
and the Law, 80 CALIF. L. REV. 513, 518 (1992).
290. Robert C. Denicola, Copyright in Collections of Facts: A Theory for the
Protection of Nonfiction Literary Works, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 516, 528 (1981)
(characterizing outcomes in pre-Feist sweat of the brow cases). As Professor
Heald has explained in the trade dress context:
The disrepute into which SearsICompco fell was not only the
result of a failure to understand that Goldstein, Kewanee, andAronson
were not "at war with the philosophy of SearsICompco," but also an
interesting sociological phenomenon: antipathy for the copycat. Many
cases have evinced a visceral dislike of the competitor who "intention-
ally copies" a product. Frequently, copiers are condemned without
analysis of the valuable function the patent law recognizes they serve:
lowering of prices through cheap reproduction and preventing the
reinvention of the wheel.
Heald, supra note 106, at 982 (footnotes omitted).
291. Cf Keene Corp. v. Paraflex Indus., Inc., 653 F.2d 822, 824 (3d Cir.
1981) (reh'g en banc) (noting that "natural inclination" to condemn copying in
the trade dress context "must give way to the public policy favoring competition,
even by slavish copying, of products not entitled to federal patent protection");
American Safety Table Co. v. Schreiber, 269 F.2d 255, 272 (2d Cir.) ("[I]mitation
is the life blood of competition. It is the unimpeded availability of substantially
equivalent units that permits the normal operation of supply and demand to
yield the fair price society must pay for a given commodity."), cert. denied, 361
U.S. 915 (1959).
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to intellectual property the constitutional coherence it de-
serves,"292 this coherence is as long overdue in the trade dress
area as it historically has been in the copyright sphere.
Although the Court may have abandoned the constitutional
preemption analysis employed in Compco, this retreat should not
obscure the Court's reafrations of Compco's other holding,
namely that nonfunctionality is a constitutional prerequisite for
trade dress protection that is immune to statutory abro-
gation.
29 3
Nor, for that matter, should it obscure Feist's clear in-
struction on how to apply the constitutional right to copy to
subject matter consisting of both protectable and unprotectable
elements.2 94 Although "[t]he line between nonfunctional and
functional is difficult to draw and an obvious source of liti-
gation,"295 standards for drawing that line not only exist, they
demarcate the public domain just as much as they define
proprietary rights.29 6 Recognition of a thin level of protection
for trade dress consisting primarily of functional elements,
equivalent to the thin copyright for factual compilations
recognized in Feist, would return federal law to the constitu-
tional foundations apparent in the express text of the Intellec-
tual Property Clause and in Compco and its progeny.297
292. David Lange, Sensing the Constitution in Feist, 17 U. DAYTON L. REV.
367, 367 (1992).
293. See Merchant & Evans, Inc. v. Roosevelt Bldg. Prods. Co., 963 F.2d 628,
633-34 (3d Cir. 1992) ("To allow indefinite trademark protection of product
innovations would frustrate the purpose of the limited duration of patents to
foster competition by allowing innovations to enter the public domain after
[twenty] years.").
294. To paraphrase Feists constitutional holding, "[als a constitutional
matter, [trade dress] protects only those constituent elements of a work that
possess more than a de minimis quantum of [nonfunctionality]." Feist
Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 363 (1991).
295. Kohler Co. v. Moen Inc., 12 F.3d 632, 649 (7th Cir. 1993) (Cudahy, J.,
dissenting); see also Truck Equip. Serv. Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., 536 F.2d 1210,
1218 (8th Cir.) ('The line between functionality and nonfunctionality is not...
brightly drawn in every case."), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 861 (1976).
296. Cf Lange, supra note 237, at 150 ("[N]o exclusive interest should ever
have affirmative recognition unless its conceptual opposite is also recognized.
Each right ought to be marked off clearly against the public domain.").
297. Although this Article has focused on the nonfunctionality requirement
under federal law, it is apparent that a thin concept of trade dress is warranted
in applications of state law as well, albeit for statutory, rather than constitu-
tional, reasons. Under federal patent law, functionality is a statutory
requirement for the issuance of a utility patent, see 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994), and
the Patent and Trademark Office routinely disallows claims in utility patent
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Failure to take such a step, however, will stretch the thin line
separating protectable trade dress and the public domain beyond
the breaking point.
applications that cover nonutilitarian aspects of putative inventions. See
PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, UNITED STATES DEPT OF COMMERCE, MANUAL
OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 706.03(p), at 700-19 (6th ed. 1995)
(defining procedures governing the statutory rejection for lack of utility). If, as
Bonito Boats held, material potentially falling within the scope of permissible
utility patent protection is beyond the reach of state law, it necessarily follows
that, by definition, only nonfunctional elements remain.
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